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While still an economically developing country, Thailand possesses a commercial fishery com- 
parable to those of the economically developed nations. The Thai fishing industry, one of the 
world's ten largest, with a fleet of over 20,000 modem vessels and a catch of about 2 million tonnes 
annually, supplies 20 kg of fish per capita to a population of 50 million and earns the country half 
a billion dollars in foreign exchange annually. However, Thailand's fishery management capabilities 
continue to be those of a developing country, lagging far behind the industry's exploitation capabili- 
ties. Moreover, the rapid development of the Thai trawl fishery and the stagnation of the small-scale 
coastal fishery have resulted in a dualistic structure with small-scale fisheries employing over 70% of 
the total number of fishermen, but landing less than 30% of the total catch. 
Though somewhat unique, Thailand's experience is of particular relevance to developing coun- 
tries that are trying to develop large-scale fisheries capable of exploiting fully their extended fisher- 
ies jurisdictions, often without paying attention to developing commensurate management capabili- 
ties. Several lessons can be learned from studying Thailand's overextended and refractory trawl 
fishery, depleted demersal resources and depressed coastal fishing communities. 
The study documents the profitability of the trawl fishing, the poverty of small-scale fisher- 
men, the heavy overfishing of the Gulf of Thailand, and the discrepancy between the catching power 
of the Thai fishing industry and the management and enforcement capabilities of Thailand and its 
neighbors. The study concludes that an effective strategy for the solution of Thailand's fisheries- 
related problems would involve the immediate halt to the construction of new trawlers, the licens- 
ing and control of the activities of existing vessels, assistance to small- and large-scale fishermen 
through fisheries enhancement projects, such as artificial reefs, community fishing rights, conclu- 
sion of more joint fishing ventures and development of alternative sources of animal protein, in- 
come and employment. CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Thailand, a developing country in Southeast Asia, with a population of fifty million and a per 
capita income of roughly US$700, boasts one of the ten largest fishing industries in the world and 
the fifth largest in Asia, a distinction accomplished with little, if  any, government assistance. The 
local fishing grounds along a coastline of 2,670 km are heavily exploited and a distant-water fleet 
employing highly sophisticated vessels and gear is deployed throughout the South China Sea and the 
Indian Oceah. In addition to annually supplying about 20 kg per head to a population of fifty 
million, the Thai fishery is one of the country's largest foreign exchange earners (US$440 million or 
6%  of the total value of exports in 1982). Thus, while still an economically developing country, 
Thailand possesses a commercial fishery comparable to  those of the economically developed nations, 
a unique accomplishment within the Third World. 
However, this disparity in development between the fishing industry and the rest of the 
economy is not without consequence. First, the capital intensity of the fishing industry is out of 
line with the country's relative factor endowments of abundant labor and scarce capital, a sheer 
misallocation of resources. Second, the development of the fishing industry has not been balanced 
but lopsided towards the trawl fishery creating a dualistic structure. Side by side with the heavily 
mechanized and highly profitable trawl fishery which accounts for over 70% of the catch but 
employs under 30% of the fishermen, operates a crowded coastal fishery using some of the most 
primitive gear and resembling the artisanal fisheries of the least developed countries. Third, Thai- 
land's fisheries exploitation capabilities, being those of a long-distance fishing nation, far exceed 
its resource management capabilities which are still those of a developing country. As a corollary, 
because of its technological sophistication, financial strength and mobility, the large-scale fishery is 
virtually immune to regulation and government control. 
Though unique, Thailand's experience is of particular relevance to developing countries that 
are trying to develop large-scale fisheries capable of exploiting fully their extended fisheries  jurisdic- 
tions, often without paying attention to developing commensurate management capabilities. Several 
lessons can be learned from studying Thailand's overextended and refractory trawl fishery, depleted 
demersal resources and depressed coastal fishing communities. 
Yet, a study of the development, economics and management of the Thai fisheries is also of 
interest in its own right. The literature on the subject is very limited and scattered and leaves un- 
answered many important questions concerning the spectacular rise and near fall of one of the 
world's largest fishing industries. What led to the transformation of Thailand  from a developing 
country of subsistence rice farmers and coastal artisanal fishermen to a long-distance fishing nation 
in less than two decades? What accounts for the persisting dualism in Thai fisheries? Why did 
coastal fishermen neither extend their fishing range by upgrading their technology nor find better 
employment opportunities in the rapidly growing trawl fishery or elsewhere in the economy? How 
profitable is the trawl fishery today after 20 years of relentless expansion? What is the state of the 
Thai fishery resource? Is it overfished and how severely? How has the fishing industry adjusted to 
the two unprecedented external shocks of the 1980s, the precipitous rise in the oil prices and the 
loss of some 300,000 km2 of traditional fishing grounds as a result of the declaration of extended 
fisheries jurisdictions by neighboring countries? Is the Thai' fishing industry overcapitalized as a result, and how much relief does the opportunity for joint fishing ventures with other countries 
offer to Thailand? What are the prospects and policy alternatives? 
These are some of the questions we will attempt to answer or at least to illuminate. They 
are not easy questions and the database is not solid enough for a firm stand on every issue. Yet, the 
success of any policy initiative or management scheme will depend squarely on understanding past 
developments, the current situation and future prospects of the Thai fisheries within both the 
national and the regional contexts. 
Inevitably, the study is not without limitations. First, the scope is limited; it does not deal, for 
instance, with some economic aspects such as infrastructure, marketing, processing and exports or 
sociocultural and human factors such as values and attitudes or group behavior and community 
organization, except to  the extent that they have a pronounced and direct effect on the economics, 
the state of the resource or the prospects for successful management. This is not to say that they are 
less important but to admit that we cannot do  justice to them in a study of this length. 
Second, the issues covered will not be investigated as deeply as one would have liked because a 
study of this length and scope is inevitably a compromise between breadth of coverage and depth of 
analysis. Ultimately, our information base is limited to the amount and quality of the available data. 
Some time series are too short to afford reasonable degrees of freedom for statistically valid infer- 
ences while others have gaps or inconsistencies. Still, these are the best fishery data we have, not 
only in Thailand but possibly throughout the developing world. Whenever the database is weak, 
warnings will be given to  view the findings with caution. CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
There are literally hundreds of studies on technical and biological aspects of the Thai fisheries, 
particularly of the demersal resources and the trawl industry. Very few studies, however, investigate 
the economics and management of the industry and even fewer attempt to integrate the economic 
and biological aspects of the fishery and determine the optimality of the prevailing allocation of 
resources. Here, we will review, chronologically and selectively, only the latter group of studies 
since the former are too numerous and too specialized to  be reviewed. Since, however, we built on 
the findings of these (technical and biological) studies we will have cause to refer to some of them 
in later sections of the study. 
One of the first economic studies of the Thai fisheries is by Huvanandana (1973) who esti- 
mated production functions for the Indo-Pacific chub mackerel (Rastrelliger) fishing industry. He 
also estimated and compared the costs and earnings of Thai and Chinese purse seines and encircling 
nets and concluded that the latter was the more profitable gear for exploiting the Indo-Pacific chub 
mackerel. 
The Department of  Fisheries (DOF)  has conducted three cost-and-earnings studies for the 
trawl fishery, the first in 1969 (unpublished), the second in 1974 (DOF 1974) and the third in 1977 
(Rientrakt 1979). The 1969 survey found profits across the board while the 1974 survey reported 
that all sizes of vessels suffered losses except for the large otter and pair trawlers (> 18  m long). In 
contrast, the 1977 survey found that all sizes of vessels earned substantial profits except for small 
otter trawlers (< 14  m). A more recent survey by the Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE 1983) 
found that large trawlers continue to enjoy high profits. Chapter 5 analyzes and interprets the 
results of these surveys. 
Marr et al. (1976) made a detailed review of the fisheries sector in Thailand, including profit- 
ability analysis (based on the 1969 and 1974 DOF surveys), determination of maximum sustainable 
yield, investment requirements and institutional arrangements. It is one of the first studies to 
recognize the dualistic structure of the sector, to draw attention to the misallocation of resources 
and the encroachment of foreign fishing grounds and to recommend remedial policies. While the 
study did not receive the attention it deserves, it has drawn attention to economic and other factors 
beyond the conventional biological and technical aspects of the fishery and has stimulated further 
studies. The findings of this rather dated study will be compared with ours in the relevant sections. 
Vattanavengpanit (1979) estimated the supply and demand functions for marine shrimp. The 
price coefficients of both the supply and domestic demand were found to be statistically insignifi- 
cant. In contrast, the coefficients on both price and income were statistically significant in the case 
of export demand. 
Panayotou (1980) in recent study reviewed the development of the Thai fisheries, analyzed the 
1969,1974 and 1977 DOF survey results and the state of the Thai fishery resources and discussed 
the sector's prospects and some policy options. Among the findings of the study were the profit- 
ability and resilience of the large-scale fishery, the depressed socioeconomic conditions of  small- 
scale fishermen, the overexploited state of fishery resources in the Gulf of  Thailand and the bleak 
prospects for joint ventures without effective management and enforcement capability by both Thailand and its neighbors. The present study is an extensive revision, update and extension of that 
earlier study in the light of the findings of Jetanavanich (1981) and more recent information. 
Jetanavanich (1981) reviewed extensively the Thai fishing industry and made the first attempt 
to determine the levels of catch and effort that will give rise to the maximum economic yield 
(MEY). He did this by estimating econometrically demand and supply functions for demersal and 
pelagic fish and equating price to the marginal cost of fishing. His main finding is that the catch in 
recent years has surpassed both the MEY and MSY  (maximum sustainable yield) and that to obtain 
the maximum net benefit from fishing in the long run fishing effort for both demersal and pelagic 
fish must be reduced by about 70%. He concluded that economic management of the fishery would 
give rise to an annual surplus value or social benefit of US$112 million. 
Rientrairut (1983), after a detailed review of the fisheries sector (both marine and inland) 
including marketing and utilization, focuses on the fisheries development planning process and 
fisheries legislation, and concludes with a review of current issues and policies. It is the most up-to- 
date review of the sector across the board in the same league as the Marr et al. (1976) review. It is 
also the first complete account of: (a) the numerous departments and agencies involved in fisheries 
planning and their respective roles; (b) existing and proposed fisheries legislations;  and (c) govern- 
ment policies and projects. Though non-analytical, the study contains very useful information, not 
available elsewhere. 
Of the numerous technical and biological studies, two relatively recent reviews summarize 
earlier findings as well as present very useful information for this study. Pauly (1979),  after a brief 
review of earlier studies dealing with the decline of catch rates in the Gulf of Thailand, focuses on 
stock interaction as reflected in the changes of the composition of the catch over time. Using Gulf 
of Thailand data, he finds that at high levels of effort the small prey fishes disappear leaving no food 
for their predators, which also decline, while opportunistic species such as flat fishes and invertebrates 
increase their biomass both in absolute and relative terms in the multispecies stock despite the 
heavy fishing pressure. He concludes that because of the species interaction "there is no single opti- 
mum level of effort which will simultaneously produce the MSY  for all . .  .  stocks" and therefore 
the simple total biomassltotal effort estimates of MSY  in the Gulf of Thailand are unreliable. He 
calls for models accounting for stock interactions, for example by dividing the stock into different 
trophic levels, determining the trophic level at which economic returns are maximized and selecting 
the appropriate fishing techniques (mesh size and gear selectivity). 
Boonyubol and Pramokchutima (1982) estimate an MSY  of 750,000 t for demersal fishery 
resources in the Gulf of Thailand to the depth of 50 m and infer that the Gulf has been overfished 
since 1973  with the number of trawlers growing from 5,000 during that year to 10,000 in 1982 
(estimations of MSY  by other studies will be reviewed in Chapter 8). They also present evidence 
showing that despite the manyfold increase in total catch, the catch of food fish increased only 
slightly since 1963,  most increases being of trash fish (63% in 1980). Even more alarming is the 
evidence that trash fish is comprised of a high and rising proportion of juvenile food fish (37%  in 
1981). The small-scale or artisanal fishery is reported to account for 13%  of fishing effort and 37% 
of the catch of edible fish from the Gulf. The authors conclude that the most cost-effective measure 
for protecting the demersal resources of the Gulf is to,  control the number of trawlers. 
There are several studies of small-scale fisheries-Cole  and Anand (1974),  DOF (1978,1979), 
Panayotou (1980), Kumpa (1981),  Panayotou et al. (1982 and 1985) and Panayotou and Panayotou 
(1985). Cole and Anand (1974) estimate annual income to be 7,500 baht (US$ = 20 baht in 1974) 
for a Buddhist family and 4,200 baht for a Muslim one. These estimates compared unfavorably with 
both the income of crewmen of large trawlers (over 12,000 baht) and the national average for all 
occupations that year (over 30,000 baht). 
The DOF (1978) on the other hand, found a wide spectrum of annual earnings (8,000 to over 
20,000 baht) among small-scale fishermen in Ban Ta Sao fishing village in Songkhla Province depend- 
ing on type of gear. Bamboo screens and set bags occupying premium locations were far more profit- 
able than either cast nets or gill nets. The DOF (1979) found that a "typical" household in a fishing 
village in Pathalung Province operated a gill net and earned an annual income of 11,900 baht (com- 
pared to a national average over 30,000 baht in 1979),  with location again appearing to be a crucial 
determinant of earnings. 
Panayotou (1980) reviews the socioeconomic conditions of  small-scale fishermen and their 
conflicts with larger scale fishermen, evaluates their benefits from government policies and examines their prospects. Emphasis is placed on the need for non-fishing activities to raise the small-scale fish- 
ermen's opportunity cost so that their incomes might be improved and fishery resources allowed to 
recover. 
Kumpa (1981) analyzed the productivity, cost structure and profitability of small-scale fishing 
operations in Chumphon Province. She found that the most important determinants of catch and 
earnings were experience, size of boat and fishing time, and that fishermen were efficient in their 
use of inputs but their earnings varied according to  the type and size of gear. The pelagic gear, purse 
seines and (drift) gill nets in particular, were found to be considerably more profitable than the 
demersal gear (trawls and push nets). The author infers that this is due to the overexploitation of 
demersal resources and recommends government assistance for the conversion of trawlers into 
pelagic gear and for creation of supplementary sources of income such as brackishwater fish culture 
for coastal fishermen. 
Panayotou et'al. (1985) compared and analyzed income levels and other indicators of well- 
being among four coastal provinms in Thailand-Chumphon, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Phangnga and 
Trat (Fig. 2.1). It  was found that the average coastal fishing household with an annual income of 
about US$2,500 (1978) was at least as well off as the average Thai household. However, there was 
'. 
! 
Thai  land 
Fig. 2.1. Coastal provinces of Thailand and bordering countries and seas. considerable variation among locations (and types of gear); Trat and Chumphon households earned 
incomes that were two to three times higher than those of the other two provinces. Nakhon Si 
Thammarat, in particular, suffering from both an unprofitable fishery and lack of  alternative 
employment opportunities, was identified as a priority area for government assistance. 
Tokrisna et al. (1985) estimated fishing production functions by type of gear and by location 
as well as for combined gears and locations. They found that technical efficiency varied among gears 
operating in the same location and for the same type of gear operating in different locations. 
Overall, the most productive gears were shell rakes in Trat, purse seines in Chumphon, push nets in 
Nakhon Si Thammarat and set bag nets in Phangnga. In terms of price efficiency, it was profitable 
for fishermen with less traditional gear to increase the size and engine power of their vessel, and for 
more traditional types to increase the use of labor. In terms of social profitability, however, virtual- 
ly all types of gear should be gliven incentives to employ more labor. 
Panayotou et al. (1982) compared indebtedness, cost structure and profitability between 
small- and medium-scale gear groups (according to fishing assets) in the same four provinces as in 
the previous two studies. Isolation rather than scale of operation was found to be responsible for 
high interest rates. The cost share of fuel, the main cash cost item, was lower for small-scale units 
which were more labor intensive although very little labor was hired outside the family. Therefore, 
cheap fuel and cheap labor policies tend to favor the medium- and large-scale fishermen who use 
relatively more of both these inputs. While limited capital is usually the binding constraint for 
small-scale operations, subsidized credit would not necessarily solve the problem because of fishery- 
resource constraints. Economic overfishing was found to exist in relation to certain combinations of 
gears and fishing grounds (e.g., trawls in Chumphon, wing set bag in Nakhon Si Thammarat, push 
net in Phangnga and fish gill net in Trat). For the small-scale fishery as a whole, there were still 
some, but not substantial, rents (net profits above all fishing costs). 
Panayotou and Panayotou (1985) have studied geographical and occupational mobility among 
small-scale fishermen in Chumphon and Phangnga based on two extensive surveys carried out five 
years apart. They found that fishermen are responsive to economic incentives and move between 
occupations and locations to take advantage of earning differentials. Yet, this mobility is far from 
perfect. Labor is quite mobile between occupations but less so between locations. Capital tends to 
be less mobile than labor at least in the short run, Fishermen expressed a certain attachment to their 
occupation and place of residence but they were prepared to change both if  a  better paying oceupa- 
tion could be found having some of the most valued features of their current occupation and 
location, such as the freedom and independence of  "being one's own boss" and the rural setting of 
their communities. Religion and distance were also found to constrain mobility. In general, mobility 
of labor out of fishing was greater than mobility into fishing; outmigration was rather temporary 
and in response to economic incentives while inmigration was more permanent but less significant, 
and socially rather than economically motivated. This is to be expected in the light of the finding of 
the study that rents from fishing have been dissipated, especially in Chumphon. CHAPTER 3 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
Unlike the great maritime nations of Japan, Norway and the Soviet Union, which have had a 
long history of fisheries development, Thailand's large-scale fishery is of a very recent origin. Prior 
to the early 1960s, the Thai marine fisheries were concentrated along the coast and employed 
mostly small-scale gear, such as bamboo traps, which remained unchanged for centuries. Following 
the successful introduction of trawl fishing in 1960 with assistance from West Germany, the struc- 
ture of the Thai fisheries underwent radical changes (Tiews 1965,1973).  In 1959 the entire marine 
fishery of Thailand consisted of 1,490 bamboo traps, 192 Chinese purse seines and 187 Thai purse 
seines and landed a total catch of less than 150,OQQ  t. Four years later, in 1963, the same fishery 
employed over 2,000 trawlers and 500 encircling gill nets while the number of  bamboo traps 
dropped to 662, purse seines to 211; the catch more than doubled (see Table 3.1). 
While the cost of the new technology, about half a million baht per unit in the early 1960s1, 
was far beyond the meagre resources of bamboo trap fishermen, its profitability attracted finan- 
cially powerful investors from the urban centers (especially Bangkok) in what for centuries used to 
be a poor man's occupation. The trawling fleet expanded rapidly from less than 100  trawlers in 
1960 to about 6,000 by 1973  while less than 200 bamboo traps remained in operation (Table 3.2). 
The annual catch increased more than tenfold during the period compared with less than twofold 
during the preceding period of equal span (Table 3.3), while the catch per unit of effort declined by 
83%  between 1961  and 1973  (see Fig. 8.1). 
Not only was the new technology more costly and at the same time more profitable, but it also 
opened up new more abundant offshore resources which required a longer fishing range and faster 
and larger vessels. The new technology was clearly neither scale-neutral nor obtainable through 
gradual capital accumulation and progressive upgrading of existing technology. Not only was the 
required investment large and the departure from the traditional technology radical, but also the 
open-access status of the offshore resources underlined the importance of speed of investment and 
technological change. Only those with substantial venture capital of their own or ready access to 
inexpensive institutional credit, up-to-date information  and entrepreneurial experience had  a 
competitive advantage in joining the race for the open-access resources, a race which called for 
increasingly longer fishing trips to deeper and rougher seas. 
Soon enough (early 1970s) the race was carried out to the fishing grounds of other nearby 
countries and the deep seas, necessitating not only larger vessels, but also more sophisticated naviga- 
tion equipment, echo sounders for locating fishing grounds and radars for detecting pirates and the 
patrol vessels of neighboring countries, as well as armaments for self-defense. The capital cost of a 
fishing unit rose virtually overnight from few hundred baht (mostly in terms of local material and 
labor) to several hundred thousand baht. The total capital stock of the industry rose from less than 
a billion baht in 1963  to over 11 billion baht in 1982, both measured in constant 1976  prices.1 
'  From figures estimated by the Fishing Vessel Development Section, Marine Fisheries Division, Department 
of Fisheries, Bangkok, Thailand. Table 3.1. Number of selected types of gear (fishing units) registered, and marine fish caught (t) in Thailand during . 
1949-1966. 
Marine gear  Marine catch 
Pelagic  Demersal  (t x  lo3) 
Year  BST  CPS  TPS  EGN  trawlers  Demersal  Pelagic  Total 
-  Not in use. 
'Slightly  lower figures, 494.2, 529.5, 635.2 and 762.2, respectively, are given in Department of Fisheries, Fish- 
eries Record of Thailand, various issues. 
Notation  :  BST = bamboo stake traps; CPS  = Chinese purse seine; TPS = Thai purse seine;  and EGN = Encircling 
gill net. 
Source  :  Phasuk (1978) and Department of Fisheries, Thai Fisheries Vessel Statistics, various issues. 
- 
The small-scale coastal fishermen had clearly no competitive advantage in large-scale offshore 
fishing. They had special skills in constructing small boats, repairing nets, locating fish in shallow 
coastal waters and operating traditional gear, useful skills for a crewman on a large trawler but 
neither necessary nor sufficient for joking the race for offshore resources. The latter calls for access 
to venture capital, entrepreneurial skills and up-to-date information on technology, fishing grounds 
and markets, all of which are more readily available to the investors of Bangkok and of large coastal 
towns than to the coastal fishermen in remote fishing communities. Moreover, the necessary infra- 
structure, such as ports, landing facilities, roads and markets was made available only to Bangkok 
and large coastal towns. 
Economic theory predicts that, in the presence of exchange; factor (i.e., labor and capital) 
mobility and growth, dualism cannot be but a short-run disequilibrium phenomenon. This, however, 
presupposes well-functioning product and factor markets, and this can hardly be said of markets in 
Thailand. Markets are said not to be well-functioning when they are either uncompetitive, frag- 
mented or distorted. Of  particular importance are the imperfections and distortions of the capital 
market. In theory, all producers, small and large, should have access to the same capital markets at 
the same rate of interest without the need of collateral. 
The market may be said to be imperfect if it provides lower-cost credit to those who already 
have substantial amounts of capital of their own than to those who do not, thereby exacerbating 
rather than mitigating initial disparities in factor endowments. Factor markets are said to be dis- 
torted when government interventions in the market result in prices which do not reflect the true 
scarcities of resources. For example, in Thailand, investment privileges, interest rate ceilings, trade 
policies, public expenditures and minimum wage policies favor the use of  scarce capital and penalize 
the use of abundant labor; at the same time they make subsidized credit available to large-scale 
operations through investment privileges and dry up rural credit to small-scale operations through 
interest rate ceiling;. Table 3.2. Number of fishing boats registered by type of fishing method, Thailand, 1967-1982. 
-  - - - -  - - -  -  -  -  - - - 





Thai purse seine 
Chinese purse seine 
Anchovy purse seine 
Luring purse seine 
Sllbtotal seine 
Spanish mackerel gill net 
Pomfret gill net 
Encircling gill net 
Shrimp gill net 
Other gill nets 





Squid cast net 
Total 





Thai purse seine 
Chinese purse seine 
Anchovy purse seine 
Luring purse seine 
Subtotal seine 
Spanish mackerel gill net 
Pomfret gill net 
Encircling gill net 
Shrimp gill net 
Other gal nets 





Squid cast net 
Total 
-  :  Nil or negligible. 
n.a.  :  Not available. 
Sources :  Data for.1967-1982  obtained from Marr et al. (1976);  others from Department of Fisheries Thai Fishing 
Vessels Statistics, Bangkok, various issues. Table 3.3. Annual catch (t)  by fishing ground, Thailand, 1957-1982. 
The Gulf of  The Indian 
Year  Thailand  Ocean  Total 
1957  159,435  11,965  170,900 
1958  137,215  7,784  145,000 
1959  139,338  8,431  147,770 
1960  135,740  10,731  146,471 
1961  227,746  5,529  233,275 
1962  256,649  13,060  269,709 
1963  314,962  8,411  323,373 
1964  472,226  21,970  494,196 
1965  513,096  16,387  529,483 
1966  605,020  30,145  135,165 
1967  647,664  114,524  762,188 
1968  841,810  162,248  1,004,058 
1969  909,423  270,172  1,179,595 
1970  1,098,562  237,128  1,335,690 
1971  1,232,721  237,368  1,470,289 
1972  1,318,060  230,097  1,548,157 
1973  1,246,822  291,194  1,538,016 
1974  1,107,098  244,492  1,351,590 
1975  1,172,420  222,188  1,394,608 
1976  1,295,742  256,050  1,551,792 
1977  1,724,818  342,718  2,067,533 
1978  1,633,173  324,612  1,957,785 
1979  1,493,943  319,215  1,813,158 
1980  1,306,893  341,060  1,647,953 
1981  1,465,480  358,964  1,824,444 
1982  1,561,039  425,532  1,986,571 
Source :  Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives, Fisheries Record of Thailand, various 
issues. 
Unfavorable initial factor endowments and lack of access to capital markets suffice to explain 
the inability of many coastal fisheken to upgrade their technology and extend their fishing range 
to other, potentially more abundant coastal resources. With few exceptions of wealthy small-scale 
fishermen, it was the fish traders and other nonfishermen with access to capital who acquired  fhe 
new technology. Unlike the large-scale fishermen who, in addition to their own high profits, have 
access to low-interest, often government-subsidized loans, the small-scale fishermen borrow from 
informal credit markets (e.g., fish traders and middlemen) at rates which, though only implicit in 
marketing arrangements, are a multiple of those charged by banks. The high profits from offshore 
fishing, supplemented by easy access to subsidized capital and government-provided  landing facili- 
ties, enabled the trawling industry to increase its fishing range and expand to fishing grounds out- 
side the Thai waters as the harvest in Thai waters declined due to heavy fishing. 
Having failed to expand their fishing range by upgrading their technology and joining the race 
for the offshore resources, the small-scale fishermen could only lose from the advent of the new 
technology. The biological interdependence between coastal and offshore resources became increas- 
ingly evident. The coastal resources became gradually depleted as trawlers enroached on coastal 
fishing grounds for high-value species (e.g., shrimp). At the same time, coastal fishermen's stationary 
or relatively immobile fishing gear suffered damage from the hit-and-run operations of trawlers in 
coastal fishing grounds. Last but not least, the massive landings of trawlers depressed the price of 
fish and hence the incomes of coastal fishermen whose catch remained at best stagnant. For example, 
the price of fish fell in real terms during most of the 1970s (see Table 3.4). 
Under these circumstances, one would expect that small-scale fishermen would seek and obtain 
employment as crewmen in the rapidly expanding trawl fishery or abandon fishing for other more 
lucrative employment opportunities. Though up-todate reliable figures are not available, it is 
apparent from interviews with fishermen (see Panayotou and Panayotou 1985) that some did take employment in the offshore fishery and others abandoned fishing altogether, but clearly most 
small-scale fishermen stayed on. According to Table 3.5, fishing households with two or fewer 
employees declined by 29% between 1967  and 1976  and fishing laborer households declined by 
34%  during the same period. 
Table 3.4. Fish prices (bahtlkg) in Thailand, 1971-1982. 
Weighted  Real 
average 
Year  Demersal fish  Pelagic fish  cephalopoda  Crustacean  priceC  b  ""'Yf'  price 
'Squid  and cuttlefish. 
b~hrirnp  and crab. 
'Weighted  average price  =  Xn Pisi where Si = proportion of species i to total amount of demersal resources 
i=  1 
caught by a research vessel (Prarnong 11), i.e.,  0.70, 0.07, 0.20  and 0.03 for demersal fish, pelagic fish, cephalopod 
and crustacean, respectively. 
d~eflated  by the consumer price index (1976 = 100). 
Source :  Computed from Appendix Table A.3. 
Table 3.5.  Recorded  number of  fishing households, fishermen  and vessels in the marine fishery of  Thailand for 
selected years.  -- 
1.  Fishing households  50,968  43,660  43,520  38,702  40,536 
Fishing operator households  38,292  33,631  34,903  31,587  32,207 
with 3 or more employees 
('enterprise')  2,352  3,268  2,660  5,524  6,311 
with 2 or fewer employees 
('subsistence')  35,940  30,423  32,243  26,063  25,558 
Fishing laborer households  12,6  76  9,969  8,6 17  7,115  8,329 
2.  Fishing population and fishermen 
Fishing population  315,897  269,009  271,132  249,618  257,254 
Fishermen  75,676  77,886  74,086  64,277  69,927 
Occupied solely in fishing  -  -  56,708  48,519  51,198 
Occupied mainly in fishing  -  -  11,985  12,027  13,754 
Occupied partly in fishing  -  -  5,393  3,731  4,999 
3.  Fishing vessels  35,631  -  27,521  26,439  26,135 
Non-powered vessels  16,584  -  8,313  6,918  5,367 
Powered vessels  19,047  -  19,208  19,521  20,768 
Inboard engine  -  -  8,760  10,550  10,435 
Outboard engine  -  -  10,448  8,971  10,333 
-  Data not available. 
Source :  DOF 1967;Marine Fisheries Inventory Survey 1970,1973 and 1976;  and Marr et al. (1976). Why do not more coastal fishermen find employment in the trawl fishery or move to other 
sectors of the economy? The combination of four reasons appears responsible. 
First, the trawl technology is intrinsically capital intensive. It has been more so in Thailand 
than in some other countries because of the distorted relative factor prices which favor capital and 
penalize labor; capital of large-scale investments is subsidized through tax privileges; large borrowers 
with collateral have access to subsidized low-interest institutional credit; the government tacitly 
encouraged investment in large capital-intensive  vessels to increase Thailand's share of distant-water 
resources; fishing vessels have access to duty-free capital equipment from neighboring countries such 
as Singapore; and government provided landing facilities and exploration research. At the same time 
the use of additional labor is hindered by minimum wage legislation, labor union activities and the 
customary arrangement of providing crewmen with food and a share of the catch in addition to 
wage. 
Second, the large-scale fishery has had easy access to inexpensive labor from labor surplus 
areas such as the northeast; impoverished and adventurous youth travel around the major coastal 
towns in search of  employment and adventure often found on the offshore and distant-water 
fishing fleet. Small-scale fishermen with families living in remote fishing communities are less willing 
to  join long and arduous fishing trips for a comparatively unattractive wage. 
Third, alternative employment opportunities have not been easily forthcoming to remote 
fishing communities. 
Fourth, fishermen are not particularly known for their mobility although given a sufficiently 
attractive alternative many if not most would have made a move (see Panayotou and Panayotou 
1985). Attractive employment opportunities are scarce in a country with surplus labor, especially. 
when one takes into account the costs of retraining and relocation and the psychological and other 
nonquantifiable costs involved. 
Thus, a combination of distorted factor prices, easy access to a pool of inexpensive non-fishing 
labor, limited occupational and geographic mobility among small-scale fishermen and scarcity of 
alternative employment opportunities can explain why they continue operating in the traditional 
fishing grounds with the traditional technologies. They still manage to earn incomes which, however 
meagre, are higher than what they can earn from their next best alternative, net of the costs of 
change and the perceived risk. 
As a result, a dualistic structure has emerged and persists with a mobile and rapidly growing 
trawling industry alongside an immobile and stagnating coastal fishery. The income earning posi- 
tions of the two fishing subsectors differ greatly reflecting disparities in opportunity costs, which in 
turn result from varied factor endowments, differential access to capital markets and dispropor- 
tionate shares in government benefits, as well as differential mobility. 
A second not unrelated factor contributing to a wide divergence in incomes is the differential 
ability of the two subsectors to maintain their profits in the face of the open-access nature of the 
resources and recurring economic shocks. Profits (or rents), defined here as revenues above all costs 
of fishing, are expected to be competed away by new entrants or unfavorable changes in economic 
circumstances. However, despite the open-access status of the Thai resources and the steep rises in 
fuel costs that ought to have hastened the dissipation of profits, the resilient trawl fishery appears 
to be as profitable as ever while the relatively immobile coastal fishermen are literally fishing for 
subsistence. CHAPTER 4 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Cost and Earnings 
An economic activity, to be worthwhile and viable in the long run, must earn sufficient reve- 
hues to cover both variable and fixed costs. These include the cost of not only purchased inputs but 
also imputed costs for own labor, as well as depreciation and interest on capital. In other words, 
the revenues must be high enough to cover the opportunity costs (foregone earnings from alterna- 
tive uses) of all inputs including own and borrowed capital and family and hired labor. If there are 
no barriers to entry and exit  and no recurring external shocks, an economic activity would tend, in 
the long run, to an equilibrium characterized by equality between revenues and costs (and hence 
zero excess profits) and a more or less stable number (and size) of economic units engaged in the 
activity. Such a state of affairs is usually characteristic of a mature industry operating in a competi- 
tive market. From both the individual firm and the society's point of view it is rational to expand 
the activity to the point of zero marginal profit (assuming no side effects) as this will maximize 
both the individual and the social returns from the activity. 
Fishing, however  similar to exploitation of other renewable resources such as forests, is an 
economic activity with a difference. One of the inputs into this activity, the fish stock, though a 
scarce resource (often more scarce than labor and capital), is available to the individual fisherman 
free of charge. While scarce to the society the fish stock is a free good to the individual fisherman. 
It is in the society's interest to economize the use of the fish stock, in the same way that the use of 
other scarce resources is economized, but the individual fisherman has no incentive to economize a 
resource to which he has essentially open and free access. To the society the fish resource is scarce 
and its use involves a social cost (user cost); to  the individual fisherman the fish resource is abun- 
dant and its use involves no cost. 
Thus, the total costs of fishing are lower for the individual than for the society and hence the 
fishing activity (i.e., levels of fishing effort) is carried beyond the level that is socially worthwhile. 
The individual fisherman may still be adding to his profits while the society is incurring increasing 
losses as the fishing activity expands (and hence total costs increase) beyond a certain point. Even- 
tually, if  there are no barriers to entry, the equilibrium of zero excess profits for the fishing indus- 
try would be reached. Fishermen would still cover all their costs, including opportunity costs, but 
the society would not. The latter suffers a net loss by not covering the user cost of the fish stock, a 
resource at least as scarce and valuable as labor and capital. 
These ideas are shown diagrammatically in Fig. 4.1, which depicts the relationships between 
costs and fishing effort and revenues and fishing effort. The cost-effort relationship (TC) is linear 
because unit costs are assumed constant and, therefore, total costs (which do not include the user 
cost of the resource) are proportional to effort. The revenue-effort relationship (TR) is dome-shaped 
because as effort expands revenues rise less than proportionately reflecting the progressive depletion 
of the fish stock. Eventually, a point (M) is reached beyond which further expansion of effort 
produces a decline rather than a rise in revenues, Point M corresponds to what is known as the 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY), i.e.,  the maximum catch which can be sustained over the long 
run with a stable fish stock and a constant level of effort. 0  E  M  B 
Effort 
Fig. 4.1. A  fixed price model of a fishery indicating the maximum economic 
yield  (MEY), maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and bionomic equilibrium (BE) 
under open access. TR = total revenue; TC = total cost. 
If the fishery is worth exploiting at all, revenues at low levels of effort exceed costs, that is, 
excess profits do exist. Profits attract additional fishing effort and while the profit per unit of effort 
falls steadily the total profit of the fishery as a whole rises up to a point, E, beyond which addi- 
tional effort reduces both the individual fisherman's and the industry's profit. Point E corresponds 
to what is known as the maximum economic yield (MEY), i.e., the maximum economic return or 
profit that can be sustained over the long run with a stable fish stock and constant effort. 
Under conditions of open access, however, effort will continue to expand until all profit is 
dissipated and a level of effort, B, is reached where total revenues equal total costs, known as bio- 
nomic equilibrium at which both effort and fish stock stabilize. At B there is no incentive for 
expansion of effort and if, for some reason, effort expands beyond B there would be losses inducing 
exit and return to B. Open-access fisheries operating in a stable economic and physical environment 
without barriers to entry are expected to gravitate towards a bionomic equilibrium (see Gordon 
1953; Scott 1955). If they do not, there must be either barriers to entrylexit or recurring external 
shocks such as changes in economic and environmental parameters that prevent the system from 
completing the adjustment process. 
At the bionomic equilibrium fishermen continue to earn the opportunity costs of their inputs 
but the society does not. The dissipated profit represents precisely the user cost which ought to 
have been paid by the users of the resource (fishermen) and received by the owner (the society). 
Seen from another angle, the society as owner of the fish resource, like the owner of land or other 
resources, is entitled to a rent for its use. Since the rent reflects thegcarcity value of the resource, 
the more scarce the resource the higher the rent to which the society (or any other owner) is 
entitled. It is precisely this increase in rent with scarcity that helps rationalize the use of the re- 
source and conserve it at its "optimal"  level. At the bionomic equilibrium, however, the society 
earns no rent as if  the fish resource were ubiquitous or useless. 
Were the society to charge fishermen a rent or user cost for the resource, the total costs of 
fishing, which now include only labor and capital costs, would rise substantially above current 
levels. The higher fishing costs would make part of current fishing unprofitable thereby reducing 
fishing effort and conserving the resource at the level which maximizes the net benefit to the 
society from its scarce fishery and non-fishery resources. Fishermen would still cover all their (opportunity) costs but there will be less fishing effort, i.e., fewer fishing trips, fewer boats and 
fewer fishermen. 
What about the loss of employment? If the fishing industry is small relative to the national 
economy, there would be no significant effect on employment since the released fishermen (and 
capital) would find employment in the rest of the economy at their opportunity cost which, in 
equilibrium, is not below their current fishing income. There would be a negative employment 
effect if  the fishing industry is relatively large and the opportunity cost of labor (and capital) are 
not independent of the level of employment in the fishing industry (see Anderson 1977). In most 
cases, however, including Thailand, the fishing industry is small relative to the rest of the economy 
especially in terms of employment. 
A second case in which the incomes af fishermen might be affected by the reduction of effort 
is when the fishery is in short-term disequilibrium either on its way towards a long-run equilibrium 
or following external shocks. Under these circumstances fishermen may be earning short-term 
excess profits, that is rent due to but not appropriated by the society. Taxation of total incomes 
so that these rents accrue to the government or other taxing authority (acting on behalf of the 
society) would cut the (short-term) incomes of both the remaining and departing fishermen down 
to their true opportunity costs (or long-term incomes). 
It is, therefore, of both analytical significance and policy relevance to determine the private 
and social profitability of the industry  by calculating and comparing costs and earnings. This may 
be done for a number of years to establish the trend in profits or rents, which is indicative not only 
of the profitability but also the maturity and stability and openness of the industry. A number of 
poss'ibilities are shown in Fig. 4.2 and discussed briefly here. Steadily rising (excess) profits are 
reflections of either an immature fishery (I in Fig. 4.2) or of favorable changes in economic, tech- 
nological or biological parameters (I,),  e.g., rise in prices, fall in costs or improved productivity of 
the stock. Persisting stable profits (11) may reflect underlying barriers to entry which prevent their 
dissipation by new entrants. Steadily declining profits (111) under stable economic and biological 
conditions is an indication of movement towards a long-term bionomic equilibrium; otherwise they 
may reflect unfavorable changes in bioeconomic parameters. Persisting zero or near zero profits (IV) 
are evidence of the attainment of a bionomic equilibrium. Persisting losses (V) suggest the presence 
of barriers to exit which prevent unprofitable units from leaving the industry. Finally, widely 
fluctuating profits (anywhere between I and V) reflect unstable economic and/or biological environ- 
ment, or an unstable response to external shocks, such as the EEZs or the enactment of fisheries 
0 
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Fig. 4.2. A fixed price model of a fishery indicating rising profits (I and 1'), persist- 
ing  profits (11), declining profits  (111), zero  profits (IV) and persisting losses (V). 
TR = total revenue; TC = total costs. See text for further explanation. regulations. The horizontal arrows indicate the tendency of an unregulated fishery towards dissipa- 
tion of rents and open-access bionomic equilibrium. The vertical arrows show the magnitude of 
profits (rents) or losses at the corresponding level of fishing effort. TR' and TR" are total revenue 
curves corresponding to higher fish prices and/or increased productivity of the stocks. Such changes 
may generate profits where previously there were zero profits as losses. The reverse changes are also 
possible and can be depicted as downward shifts of the TR curve. 
Correspondingly, the policy implications would differ depending on the profit picture of the 
fishery. Rising profits call for controlled expansion of the fishery while falling profits call for inter- 
ventions to limit entry; zero profits suggest the need for reduction of effort while negative profits 
call for promotion of mobility and assistance for resettlement of surplus fishermen; finally, widely 
fluctuating profits call for stabilization policies to enable a planned expansion or contraction of the 
industry and improved information flow to induce more stable responses to external shocks. 
Optimal Resource Use 
If fishing effort must be controlled to prevent dissipation of economic rents or be reduced to 
reverse it once it has taken place, the question arises as to what constitutes an optimal level of effort 
at which the fishery should operate. From the economic point of view, the optimal level of effort is 
the level at which economic rents are maximized, that is, the level of effort which generates the 
maximum economic yield (MEY), which is the return to the scarcest factor of production, the fish 
stock. Of course, a managing authority may define as optimum yield that which maximizes other 
benefits such as "employment, equity or stability" but for the purpose of the present paper we will 
assume that the managing authority's objective is to maximize the economic return from the fishery 
(MEY). 
How is MEY  and the corresponding level of  effort determined? By maximizing the spread 
between total fishing revenues and costs which is accomplished by equating the marginal revenue 
(MR) of effort to  the marginal cost (MC) of effort as shown in Fig. 4.3. This in turn requires estima- 
tion of revenue and cost functions. Assuming constant cost per unit of effort (c), the cost function 
(TC) presents no difficulty. The total marginal and average costs may be written, respectively, as: 
However, estimation of the revenue function involves estimation of the underlying sustainable yield 
function which is a relationship between sustainable catch (Y) and effort (E). In the case of single- 
species fisheries a sustainable function could be easily estimated by fitting a logistic growth curve 
to catch and effort data, or, equivalently, a linear function between catch per unit effort (Y/E) and 
effort: 
where a and b are estimated parameters. 
The level of effort generating the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) can be easily obtained 
from (3) through simple differentiation as: 
MSY  itself is obtained by combining equations (3) and (5)  : 
MSY = a2/4b  .  a  .  (6) Catch (Y 
Fig. 4.3. A variable price model indicating the maximum economic yield (MEY), 
the  maximum  sustainable  yield  (MSY),  the  monopoly  position  and  the  bio- 
nomic  equilibrium  (BE) under  open  access.  MR  =  marginal  revenue; AR  = 
average  revenue; MC  = marginal  cost; AC  =  average cost; P  = price.  (Source: 
Copes 1970) 
Then the total, marginal and average revenue functions may be written, respectively, as: 
As stated earlier the optimum, or MEY, level of effort is obtained by equating MR and MC  of 
effort, i.e., 
p {a -  2bEMEY  )= C,  and  . .  .  (9) By comparing equations (5)  and (10) we obtain: 
and since c, b, p > 0 we conclude that EMEY  < EMSY,  that is, economic yields are maximized at a 
lower level of efforc (and larger stock) than physical yields. 
MEY itself may be obtained by combining equations (I),  (7) and (10): 
MEY = TRMEy -TCMEy  = p {aEMEy -  b~$Ey  }-  cEMEy 





By combining equations (I),  (5) and (7)  and comparing the result with (ll),  it can be shown that 
excess profits or economic rents (TR-TC)  are lower at EMsY  than at EMEY.  Profits are clearly 
maximized at EMEY level of effort. This is the level an exclusive and secure owner of the resource 
will select in order to make the most of his/her resource. 
Under open access too, fishermen attempt to maximize their profits but because of lack of 
exclusive property rights over the resource they have no incentive to take into account the effect of 
their fishing effort on other fishermen's catch. The guiding variable for expansion of effort is the ex- 
pected average revenue of effort rather than the marginal revenue. That is, under open access the 
profit-maximizing rule for the individual fisherman (but not society as a whole) is to expand effort 
as long as the average revenue (AR) of effort exceeds the average cost (AC) of effort, no matter 
what this might do to other fishermen's revenues and to his own future revenues. Thus, the effort. 
for the fishery as a whole expands to the point where AR = AC, or 
Solving equation (12) for E we obtain the open-access or bioeconomic equilibrium level of effort 
(EBE  ) : 
pa-c 
EBE = -  .  .  . 
pb 
By comparing equations (13) and (10) we establish that the bionomic equilibrium is obtained at 
substantially higher level of effort than MEY  but not necessarily at higher level than MSY  (it 
depends on the price-cost relationship). Moreover, by combining equations (I),  (7) and (12) we see 
that at EBE level of effort profits are totally dissipated: 
At EBE level of effort neither the fishermen earn excess profits nor the society earns economic rents 
for its scarce fishery resource. All potential surplus of revenues over costs has been totally dissipated 
in excessive effort. Reduction of  effort from EBE down to EMEY would generate substantial 
profits to the remaining fishermen (or rents to the society), and at the same time increase the size of 
the fish stock (it might even increase if  at EBE the stock is severely depleted). 
The preceding analysis assumes that the fishery under consideration is sufficiently small 
relative to the market in which it sells for changes in catch not to affect the price of fish. It is a 
fixed price model which is appropriate in the case of a local fishery selling in a national market, or a 
national fishery selling in the international market. For species such as prawns and squid which are 
exported from Thailand this model is applicable. However, for other species such as the Indo-Pacific 
mackerel which are consumed domestically, a more appropriate framework is a variable price model. Such a model is best described in terms of revenues and costs per unit of catch rather than per unit 
of effort. This is done by solving equation (3)  for E to obtain: 
The AC  and MC  in terms of catch are obtained as: 
and 
In order to derive the AR and MR  functions it is necessary to estimate the relationship between 
catch and price or the demand function for fish since the TR curve is now written as: 
TR = p(Y)  Y where dp/dY < 0  .  . .  (18) 
that is, the price of fish is not independent (but a declining function) of the catch. 
The demand function for fish may be specified as: 
where a is a constant embodying all variables other than catch that might have an influence on price 
such as incomes, prices of substitute products, population growth and changes in tastes; P is the 
slope of the demand function reflecting the effect of changes in catch on price. Now (19) may be 
written as: 
The AR and MR  functions are then obtained as: 
Again we may determine the MEY and bionomic equilibrium levels of effort by setting, respectively, 
p = MC  and p = AC. This is shown diagrammatically in Fig. 4.3 by superimposing the revenue and 
cost curves. Social benefits (profits plus consumer benefits) not just profits, are maximized at 
EMEY.  Profits, which include both resource and monopoly rents in this case, are maximized at a 
lower level of effort (where MR  = MC) while they are completely dissipated at EBE (AR = AC). 
One limitation of the fixed and variable price models just described is in the estimation of the 
sustainable yield function which assumes a single-species  fishery, in contrast with the multispecies 
composition of Thai (and other tropical) fisheries. In the absence of interspecies interactions it is 
still valid to estimate a total biomass yield curve. If, however, there are significant interdependencies 
among species, such estimates become unreliable because it is always possible to increase the stock 
and catch by depleting less prolific higher-value species and thereby stimulating the growth of 
their more prolific lower-value preys and competitors. Panayotou (1982) has suggested direct 
estimation of a sustainable value function as a way around the multispecies problem. The sustain- 
able value curve of a multispecies fishery is constructed by multiplying the sustainable yield curve 
of each species by its price and summing up over all species. The maximum value is attained at a 
level of effort lower than that required for the maximum yield because of the depletion of high- 
value sizes and species as the fishing intensity increases. However, estimation of a sustainable value 
function is beyond the scope of the present study. CHAPTER 5 
COST AND EARNINGS I: THE LARGE-SCALE FISHERY 
Ideally, we would like to have a long time-series on costs and earnings to calculate the profit- 
ability of  fishing and its changes over time. Our methodology calls for establishing trends for 
profits (Fig. 4.2). Are profits rising, falling or persisting at a more or less fixed level over time, or 
have they been completely dissipated? Unfortunately, the existing cost and price data on Thailand's 
fisheries do not allow the construction of the necessary time-series for establishing reliable trends. 
At most, we were able to compute cost and earnings for the Thai trawl fishery for the years 1969, 
1974,1977 and 1982 drawing on three surveys by the Department of Fisheries (1969,1974,1977) 
and a more recent, though limited, 1982 survey by the Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE 
1983). Because of the limited scope and unrepresentativeness of the 1982 survey most of the 
following discussion will focus on 1977 as the last year, except where more recent information is 
available. 
The 1982  OAE survey used a limited sample of 40 vessels, which included only otter trawlers 
14-25  m in length and pair trawlers 14-18  m in length to the exclusion of the numerous small trawl- 
ers (< 14  m) and the very large otter (> 25 m) and pair (> 18  m) trawlers. Even for the classes of 
trawlers that were included the capital costs and catch figures were apparently overestimated. To 
reduce the upward bias of the catch we combined the cost and price figures of the 1982 survey 
(which appear reasonable) with alternative catch figures from "The Marine Fishery Statistics Based 
on a Sample Survey 1982" (unpublished preliminary results of the Thai Department of  Fisheries). 
The latter may err on the conservative side. Unfortunately, there are no alternative figures for 
capital costs. Thus, using the conservative DOF figures for catch and the overestimated OAE figures 
for capital cost we obtain very conservative profit figures (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). If, on the other 
hand, we use only OAE figures we obtain grossly overestimated profits and unreasonable catch and 
effort figures for the fishery as a whole (see Appendix Tables A.9 and A.lO). Therefore, the 1982 
figures reported in this chapter should be regarded and interpreted with caution. 
In the next chapter, we present two 'snapshots' of the costs and earnings situation of the 
small-scale fisheries based on two surveys (1978 and 1983) which we carried out as part of other 
projects. 
The Trawl Fishery 
The trawl fishery of Thailand grew from just over 2,600 registered vessels in 1969 to over 
11,000 in 1982 (see Table 3.2). These figures are somewhat misleading since not all active trawlers 
are registered and those which are may not all be in operation. Moreover, of those which are in 
operation not all are operating in Thai territorial waters. Increasingly, over the years the fishing 
grounds for Thai vessels expanded from Thailand's shallow coastal waters to the high seas. As the 
number of vessels which are operating outside the Thai waters is unknown and varies according to 
circumstances, the resource base of the industry is not fixed and well defined. By implication catch 
and effort data are not as accurate and reliable as one would like to have for a cost and earnings 
study, but, by and large, they are indicative of the changing fortunes of the industry. Table 5.1 presents a summary picture of the catch and effort and the cost and earnings situa- 
tion of the trawl fishery as a whole. The total fishing effort, measured in standard research vessel 
(Pramong 11) hours, has expanded almost sevenfold between 1969 and 1977 to attain a threefold 
increase in catch reflecting a precipitous fall (from 103  kg/hr to 47 kg/hr) in the catch per unit of 
effort (CPUE) as shown in Table 5.3. A further decline in CPUE from 47 to 39 kg/hr and, if  the 
1982 survey is to be believed, effort occurred between 1977 and 1982. 
Withv&  sevenfold increase in effort and only a threefold increase in catch, between 1969 and 
1977,  one would expect a larger rise in costs than revenues and hence erosion of the profit margin 
of the industry. In fact, the reverse has happened; revenues in 1977 were almost seven times larger 
than in 1969 while costs increased only six times over their 1969 level; again the spread in 1982 was 
in the same direction but larger (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1. Catch, effort. revenues, costs and profits (in million baht) of the Thai trawl fishery for selected years. 
Total  Total 
No.  of  catch  effort  Total  Total  Net  Net 
Year  vessels  (t x 103)  (St hr x 106)~ revenues  costs  Profits  Capital 1  Capital 2  profitsC  profits 
 illio ion standard hours. 
b~he  1982  figures include otter trawlers 1418  m and 18-25  m and pair trawlers 1418  m, while the 1969.1974  and 1977  figures 
include also otter trawlers <  14  m and > 26  m and pair trawlers <  14  m and > 18  m.  Not only are the 1982  figures not strictly com- 
parable to the three earlier years but they should also be regarded with caution since they are derived from different souices, The 
1982  profit  figures in this and all other tables in this chapter are very conservative estimates, as we  use the conservative catch per 
vessel figures of  the Department of  Fisheries. The catch figures of  the Office of Agricultural Economics put profits at 2,920  million 
bahi and net profit at 1.906 million baht (see Appendix Table A.lO). 
dNet profits 1  = profits minus opportunity cost of  capital assumed to be 20% of  capital 1  (= current value of  fishing assets). 
Net profits 2  = profits minus opportunity cost of capital assumed to be 20% of capital 2  (= original purchase value of fishing 
asweb). 
fClearly an overestimate but it is the only figure available. 
Clearly an underestimate because of reasons given in footnotes b and e (see also Appendix Table A.lO). 
Source  :  Computed from figures reported in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
In both 1977 and 1982  the fishery earned substantial profits (gross of the return to capital), 
but suffered considerable losses in 1974 because of a sudden surge in fishing costs as a result of the 
steep rise in fuel prices during 1973-1974. Two different rates of return have been calculated; one 
based on the current value of fishing assets as appraised by the fishermen and the other on capital 
cost estimates; the first is thought to be more appropriate in explaining why existing vessels stay in 
or leave the industry while the second in explaining why new vessels enter (or refrain from entering) 
the industry. By 1977,  the capital cost of the fleet had reached 3.6 billion baht in current prices (a 
ninefold increase from 1969). Fishermen's own estimates placed the current value of their fishing 
assets at 2 billion baht. 
Both in 1969 and 1977 the industry earned a sufficiently high return, over 40% on the current 
value of assets or over 20% on capital cost (Table 5.2) to keep existing vessels in the fishery, and 
perhaps to attract a modest number of new entrants. In 1974, the trawl fishery suffered consider- 
able losses that forced many vessels out of the industry. Each of these three years marks a new era 
in Thai fisheries. 
Around 1968-1969,  following a decade of relentless entry (1,000 trawlers entered in 1967 
alone) under stable economic conditions, the trawl fishery, still confined to Thai waters was ap- 
proaching a bionomic equilibrium (a situation of zero profits). In fact, in 1969 over 300 trawlers or 
13%  of the fleet left the industry in the first net exit since the introduction of trawling in Thailand 
(see Table 5.4 and Fig. 5.1). It was about this time that the Thai fishermen began in large numbers 
to encroach on the fishing grounds of neighboring countries, and the Department of Fisheries began 
to explore actively long-distance fishing grounds as an alternative to the depleting local stocks. The underexploited waters of neighboring countries and the success in locating new fishing grounds in 
the open seas have enlarged the resource base shifting upwards the sustainable yield and revenue 
curves and creating new economic rents. The industry was quick to recover its buoyancy: the 
number of trawlers more than doubled between 1969 and 1973  (Table 5.4) and the catching power 
per vessel, defined as the ratio between standard and nominal effort, almost tripled (Table 5.3). 
Table 5.2. Revenues, costs and profits (in thousand baht) per vessel and average return to  capital, Thai trawl fishery, 
selected years. 
Return  Return 
on  on 
capital lb  capital 2'  Net  Net 
Year  Revenues  Costs  Profits  Capital 1  Capital 2  (%)  (a)  profits ld  profits 2e 
aThe 1982 figures include otter trawlers 14-18 m and 18-25 m and pair trawlers 14-18 m, while the 1969, 1974 
and 1977 figures include also otter trawlers < 14  m and > 25 m and pair trawlers < 14  m and > 18  m. Not only are 
the 1982 figures  not strictly comparable to the three earlier years but they should also be regarded with caution 
since they are derived from different sources. The 1982 profit figures in this and all other tables in this chapter are 
very conservative estimates, as we use the conservative catch per vessel figures of the Department of Fisheries. The 
catch figures  of  the Office of  Agricultural  Economics put profits (per vessel) at 645,000 baht and net profits at 
373,000 baht (see Appendix Table A.lO). 
b~rofits  divided by capital 1  (= current value of fishing assets). 
'Profits  divided by capital 2 (= current purchase price of fishing assets). 
d~rofits  minus opportunity cost of capital assumed equal to 20% of capital 1. 
eProfits minus opportunity cost of capital assumed equal to 20% of capital 2. 
f~learly  an overestimate but it is the only recent figure available. 
g~learly  underestimates because of reasons given  in footnotes a and f above (see also Appendix Table A.10). 
Source :  Computed from Tables 5.3 and 5.6. 
Table 5.3. Average catch and effort per vessel, catch and cost per unit of effort and price, cost and profit per unit 
of catch, Thai trawl fishery, selected years. 
Cost per 
unit of  Catching 
Catch per vessel  Effort per vessel  effort  CPUE~  power  Price  Cost  Profit 
Year  (t)  (% trash)  (hr)  (St hr)a  (@/st  hr)  (kglhr) (kglst hr)  index  (@/kg)  (@/kg)  (8/kg) 
aStandard hours. 
b~~~~  (catch per unit of effort) here is not necessarily equal to the CPUE of  the research vessel given in Table 
8.2 because of the smaller mesh size used by the commercial fleet. 
'The  1982 figures include otter trawlers 14-18 m and 18-25 m and pair trawlers 14-18  m, while the 1969, 1974 
and 1977 figures include also otter trawlers < 14  m and >  25 m and pair trawlers < 14  m and > 18  m. Not only are 
the 1982 figures  not strictly comparable to the three earlier years but they should also be regarded with caution 
since they are derived from different sources (see sources to Table 5.5 from which this table is derived). It was about this time that the oil crisis shocked the industry. The price of fuel rose by 138% 
between 1972 and 1974.  More damagingly, there had been no warning. The sudden and successive 
price rises took the industry by surprise following its heavy investment in a fuel-intensive distant- 
water fleet with engines, gear and nets designed for an era of low fuel prices. With fuel accounting 
for over 50% of fishing costs, the more than doubling of fuel prices meant at least a 50% increase in 
fishing costs. Between 1969  and 1974,  the cost per unit of catch rose by 77% or 13%  above the rate 
of inflation. By comparison, the price of fish rose by only 47% or 17%  below the rate of inflation. 
Not only were all profits dissipated but also the industry is estimated to have suffered losses between 
230 and 400 million baht (Table 5.1) despite the exit of about 500 trawlers (Table 5.4). Exit con- 
tinued into 1975 and the industry did not return to its 1973  size of fleet until 1977. 
By 1977 the necessary adjustments to the new realities of depleted local stocks and high fuel 
prices were made and the industry had recovered sufficiently to turn in a profit and attract 3,000 
additional trawlers into the fishery over the following three years. In fact, 1977 is a sort of land- 
mark in the historjr of the Thai fishery because of its all-time record catch of over 2 x lo6  t (Table 
3.3). No doubt, much of this catch, 40-60%  according to some estimates (Rientrairut 1983), came 
from outside the Thai territorial waters despite the high fuel prices which discriminate against 
distant-water fishing. 
But the cost of distant-water fishing was to be raised again soon. Country after country, Thai- 
land's neighbors began to declare and enforce 200-mile exclusive economic zones: Vietnam in 1977, 
Kampuchea and Bangladesh in 1978, the Philippines in 1979 and Indonesia and Malaysia in 1980. 
And then came the second oil price shock of 1979-1980. These events combined to raise the cost of 
fishing, especially in distant waters and to reduce the fish stocks at home. The declaration and 
Smaller than 
14 m otter trawler 
2,800 - 
2,600  - 







1,200 -  ,14-18  m pair trawler 
,------*c-  Larger than 
25 m otter trawler 
Smaller  than 
14 m pair trawler 
1967 68  69  70  71  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82 
Year 
Fig. 5.1. Time trends in the numbers of Thai trawl vessels, 1967-1982. Table 5.4. Registered trawling vessels of various sizes, Thailand, 1967-1983. 
Year 
-  - 
Otter trawlers 
< 14 m  14-18 m  18-25 m  > 25 m 
Pair trawlers 
< 14 m  14-18 m  > 18m 
'Figure  includes other trawlers 18-25 m and over 25 m in length, 
Source :  Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels Statistics, various issues. 
-  Zero or negligible. 
enforcement of EEZs by neighboring countries increased the risk of loss of life, capital and catch 
and made necessary investment in faster vessels and more sophisticated detection equipment to 
avoid arrest. At the same time it must have forced others to retreat into.the Thai territorial waters 
to avoid the extra cost. 
While data on these developments are not available, the 1982 survey provides some indication 
of what may have happened. First, as shown in Table 5.3 the cost per kilogram of fish caught 
doubled from 2.36 baht in 1977 to 4.77 baht in 1982,  the catch per unit of effort dropped from 47 
to 39 kg/hr, and the cost per unit of standard effort increased by at least 40% over the same period. 
The losses that must have occurred in 1980 and early 1981  forced almost 2,000 trawlers to leave 
the fishery (Table 5.4 and Fig. 5.1). As a result, the completion of adjustments to the new realities 
and the rise in fish prices during 1981-1982, substantial profits gross of the opportunity cost of 
capital were earned in 1982 attracting almost 3,000 additional trawlers into the fishery during that 
year alone. According to our conservative estimates based on the costs and prices given in the latest 
survey by the Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE 1983)  and the catch and effort statistics of 
the Department of Fisheries, the trawl fishery (excluding otter trawlers below 14  m and above 25 m 
and pair trawlers below 14  m and above 18 m) earned a profit of almost a billion baht or a return of 
20% on its capital (Table 5.1) despite the entry of 5,000 new vessels since 1977. (When only OAE 
figures were used, the estimated 1982 profits reached 3 billion baht or 58% on assets as shown in 
Appendix Table A.lO.). 
However, this aggregate picture may be somewhat misleading. The 1982 survey focused on 
trawlers above 14  m in length which have access to distant-water fishing grounds, and ignored the 
numerous small (< 14  m) trawlers with little or no access beyond the heavily exploited local fishing 
grounds. The difference in profitability between trawlers of different scale can be dramatic. In 
1974,  for example, the only vessels that registered substantial profits were large otter trawlers over 
18 m in length; smaller trawlers suffered catastrophic losses. It is, therefore, important to disaggre- 
gate the industry by type of vessel. This is done in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. A number of observations 
can be made from these tables. 
First, small trawlers have been generally less profitable than larger ones and less able to adjust 
to changing circumstances partly because of their limited access to offshore resources. Even with 
the most conservative estimate of capital costs, the otter trawlers less than 14  m had reached a 
bionomic equilibrium around 1969. In 1974  they suffered losses from which they were not able to 
recover even in 1977 which was a generally goad year for the industry as a whole. In fact, in 1977 they incurred losses at least twice as large as in 1974, failing even to cover their variable costs. Yet, 
despite a limited temporary exit (in 1970,1975 and 1978) following these losses the fleet of small 
trawlers continued to grow and reached 5,200 vessels by 1982 (see Table 5.4). This paradoxical 
behavior can be explained by the low mobility of existing trawlers out of the fishery in response to 
losses and the high mobility into the fishery of new trawlers in response to large profits from 
operating in underexploited coastal waters of neighboring countries, especially Kampuchea and 
Burma. Evidence for the validity of this explanation is provided by the relative stability of the fleet 
in depressed fishing areas and the rapid expansion of the fleet in provinces neighboring Kampuchea 
and Burma such as Trat and Ranong, respectively. 
The next size (14-18 m) otter trawlers with a longer fishing range performed somewhat better 
than the smaller trawlers. While they also were around bionomic equilibrium in 1969 and suffered 
heavy losses in 1974 they returned to bionomic equilibrium around 1977 and enjoyed substantial 
profits in 1982. Their fleet grew at a slower but more steady pace from 900 vessels in 1969  to 2,400 
vessels in 1982 with entry and exit following profits and losses closely (see Tables 5.4 and 5.6). The 
most resilient of the otter trawlers turned out to be the larger sizes, 18-25  m and over 25 m in 
Table 5.5.  Catch and effort per vessel, catch and cost per unit of effort. and price, cost and profit per unit of catch, by type and size 
of trawler, Thailand, selected years. 
Catch  Effort  Cost per 
No. of  per vessel  pervessel  unitofeffort  CPUE  Catching  Price  Cost  Profit 
Year  vessels  (t)  (% trash)  (hr)  (st hr)a  (B/st hr)  (kgmr)  (kglst hr)  power index  (8lkg)  (BFg)  (8lkg) 
<  14  m otter trawler 
14-18  m otter trawler 
18-25 m otter trawler 
> 25 m otter trawler 
< 14  m pair trawler 
14-18 m pair trawler 
> 18  m pair trawler 
:standard  hours. 
The 1982 figures should be regarded with caution, since they have been calculated based on figures from different sources (see 
sources below). 
Soume  :  Number of vessels and CPUE  (per standard hour) from Tables 5.4  and 8.2, respectively. All other figures for 1969,1974 
and 1977 from Appendix ~able$~.2  and A.3.  The 1982 figures are from Appendix Tables A.6  (costs per standard hour 
and price per kg of catch). A.7  and A.8  (catch per vessel and nominal fishing effort). length, presumably because of their longer fishing range and, hence, access to less heavily exploited 
fishing grounds. Larger trawlers managed to earn profits even in 1974, the worst year in the history 
of the Thai fisheries. It is apparently easier to adjust to higher fuel prices than depleted fishing 
grounds. Large vessels, despite their large fixed costs, manage to adjust to changing circumstances 
because they have more degrees of freedom, more options to choose from. When one fishing ground 
Table 5.6. Revenues, costs and profits per vessel and rates of return to capital by type and size of trawler, Thailand, 
selected years. 
Return  Return 
on  on  Net  Net 
Revenues  Costs  Profits  Capital 1  Capital 2  capital 1  capital 2  profits I  profits 2 
Year  (Bxlo3)  (Bxlo3)  (Bxlo3)  (px103)  (Bx103)  (%)  (%  (BX  lo3)  (BX  lo3) 
< 14  m otter trawlers 
14-18  m otter trawlers 
18-25  m otter trawlers 
> 25 m otter trawlers 
< 14  m pair trawlers 
14-18  m pair trawlers 
> 18  m pair trawlers 
n.a.  = Data not available. 
'The  1982 figures should be regarded with caution since they are derived from different sources (see sources to 
Table 5.5 from which this table is derived). 
b~ssuming  the two rates of return for intermediate size trawlers bare the average relationship of the two rates of 
return for smaller and larger pair trawlers, i.e.,  R2 = R1 (0.615 + 0.348)/2 = (29) (0.481) = 14. 
Source :  Revenues and costs from Table 5.5; capital from Table 8.4. becomes depleted they can move to another; when fuel prices in Thailand increase they refuel 
elsewhere and land their catches in nearby ports to minimize fuel cost, to take advantage of higher 
fish prices and/or t.0  avoid taxes. They also enjoy lower risk from rough seas, pirates and neighbor- 
ing countries' patrol vessels because of their sheer size, powerful engines and sophisticated detection 
and defense armory. The higher profitability of large vessels accounts for their high growth rate. In 
1969  there were only 200 vessels over 18 m in length; in 1982  there were over 1,700 of them, In 
the late 1960s  there were only a score of vessels larger than 25 m;  in 1982 there were as many as 
103  (Table 5.4). It is also of interest to  note that these giant trawlers enjoyed a reduction in the 
proportion of trash fish in their mtch from 71% in 1974  to 60% 1977 because of the ability to 
explore and exploit new fishing grounds (Table 5.5). An alternative explanation is that giant trawl- 
ers continued to catch similar amounts of fresh fish in their catches, the only difference being the 
proportion discarded at sea. 
The superiority of larger vessels, however, does not apply to pair trawlers. Pair trawlers over 
18  m long, while very costly in terms of capital and fuel consumption, are too cumbersome and 
inflexible for the modern day 'opensea' fishing which takes the form of a 'hit-and-run' operation. 
Thus, large pair trawlers have not been able to recover from their 1974 slump as rapidly as the 
medium (14-18 m) trawlers have. Yet, in 1982 both size groups were earning substantial profits as 
reflected in the 26% return on capital for medium trawlers (Table 5.6) and the massive entry of new 
vessels in both groups (Table 5.4). 
A second observation from Tables 5.5 and 5.6 is the changed fortunes of the small (< 14  m) 
pair trawlers, once the most profitable gear. In 1969 small pair trawlers enjoyed at least a 60% 
return on capital, by far the largest in the industry and saw their fleet grow from 19  vessels in 1968 
to 153  in 1973. In 1974,  they suffered such catastrophic losses, by far the largest in the industry, 
that their fleet dwindled to 70 vessels in 1977 and 50 vessels by 1982, despite a temporary recovery 
in 1979. One reason behind this dramatic change has been the rise in fuel prices that affected 
disproportionately the small pair trawlers which use two vessels usually fitted with inefficient 
second-hand automobile engines. Between 1969  and 1974 the cost per unit of effort rose by 250% 
and the cost per kilogram of fish caught by 550%. 
In conclusion, resource rents appear to have been dissipated over time for small trawlers and to 
have risen for all other groups, which have been able to adjust to the changing circumstances of high 
fuel prices, depleted local stocks and the declaration of EEZs by neighboring countries. In general, 
it could be said that profitability and size tend to be correlated because of the greater mobility and 
wider range of options for adjustment to changing circumstances that larger size can afford. Of 
course, it is not just vessel length but also engine power, speed, tonnage, technology and financial 
capital which are correlated with size that account for the greater resilience of the large-scale trawl 
fishery. In the following chapter, we turn to the other end o3he  spectrum, the traditional small- 
scale fishery, which lacks not only size but also modern technology and capital, and is confined to 
the coastal fishing gruunds around isolated fishing communities. 
A Note on the Pelagic Fishery 
While the focus of this study is on the dualism between the small-scale coastal fishery and the 
large-scale offshore trawl fishery and their interactions and conflicts, another subsector, of an 
intermediate scale, deserves some attention: the pelagic or purse-seine fishery. The two terms are 
not synonymous since trawlers, though primarily a demersal gear, also catch some pelagic fish and 
seiners, though primarily a pelagic gear, also catch some demersal fish (see Table 5.7). In this note, 
we briefly discuss the pelagic fleet and catch. An indication of the profitability of the pelagic 
fishery (purse seines and gill nets) is given in Chapter 6 where the small- and medium-scale fisheries 
are compared (see Table 6.3). A more indepth economic analysis of the pelagic fishery is not 
intended. The state of pelagic resources is discussed in Chapter 8. 
The pelagic catch accounts for roughly 20% of the total catch and 35% of the edible catch. 
Seines, the main pelagic gear, land nearly 20% of the total catch and 90% of the pelagic catch (see 
Table 5.7). In 1981  seine nets caught 337,000 t of fish, which represents a 35% increase over 1980 
and a 25% decline from 1977. One feature of the purse seine fishery is its volatility, both in terms Tsble 6.7, Annual production by fishing gear typea, 1974-1981  (t  x lo3). 
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Other small-scale gear 
Total 
'1976  data unavailable. 
Source : ADB 1985. 
of the stocks and effort, which is translated into large fluctuations in the catch. For example, the 
seine catch jumped from 102,000 t in 1975  to 436,000 t in 1977 to decline to 291,000 t in 1979. 
The variations in the purse seine catch and, therefore, in the pelagic catch partly reflect the 
historical development of the fishing industry in Thailand. Before the introduction of the trawlers, 
the Thai and Chinese purse seines and gill nets were the most prevalent marine fishing gears. With 
the introduction of trawling, many purse seiners were converted for trawling with consequent 
decline of the pelagic catch. Since the mid-1970s, the introduction of  modified "luring  purse 
seining" techniques, the declining catch rates of  trawlers and the location of new pelagic fish 
grounds in the Central Gulf gave new impetus to the pelagic fishery which has since become again a 
significant subsector of the Thai fisheries (ADB 1985). The main pelagic gears in the past have been the traditional Thai and Chinese purse seines and 
the anchovy purse seines. These gears are now increasingly replaced by the luring purse seine which 
is becoming the predominant pelagic gear of the Thai fishery. Other important pelagic gears are 
encircling giil nets and drift nets. In 1982, the licensed pelagic fleet consisted of 840 seine net 
vessels (15%  under 14  m in length) and 4,760 gill net vessels (over 90% under 14  m in length). The 
changes over time in the numbers and types of registered pelagic gear units in the Gulf of Thailand 
are given in Table 5.8, side by side with the pelagic catch attributable to these units. It is worth 
noting that while the number of fishing units remained constant between 1977 and 1981 and 
effective effort increased as a result of the replacement of Thai purse seine by luring purse seine, the 
pelagic catch has declined steadily. 




Registered fishing gear units 
Thai  Luring  Anchovy  Encircling  Total 
purse seine  purse seine  purse seine  gill net  gear units 
Source :  ADB 1985. 
The most important pelagic species caught in the Gulf of Thailand are sardines, round and 
hardtail scads and Indian and Indo-Pacific mackerels which account for 39%,31%  and 10%  of the 
pelagic catch of luring purse seines, respectively. Encircling gill nets and drift nets catch mainly 
Spanish mackerels. On the Andarnan Sea the most important pelagic species are the Indian and 
Indo-Pacific mackerels (ADB 1985). CHAPTER 6 
COST AND EARNINGS 11:  THE SMALL-SCALE FISHERY 
Until recently, there was only fragmentary information on the costs and earnings from small- 
scale fishing by some 300,000 small-scale fishermen in Thailand scattered along a coastline of 2,600 
km. The spectacul& development of the trawl fishery during the past 25 years has overshadowed 
the small-scale coastal fishery, which has managed to survive despite the keen competition from 
trawlers and the relative neglect by the government. Chapter 2 reviewed some of the earlier fragmen- 
tary information on the socioeconomic conditions of small-scale fishermen. 
This chapter discusses the results of two more recent and more systematic surveys of the cost 
and earnings situation of small-scale fisheries. The two surveys conducted in 1978  and 1983  are 
comparable (though the second is not as extensive as the first) in the strict sense of having surveyed 
precisely the same sample (or a subsample) for the purpose of identifying the changes that have 
occurred between 1978 and 1983.  In what follows is a discussion, first, of the 1978  findings in 
some detail (by province and type of gear) and then a presentation of a community by community 
comparison of incomes and rents between 1978  and 1983. A more detailed account of the results of 
the 1978  survey is given in Panayotou (1982) and of the 1983  survey in Panayotou and Panayotou 
(1985). 
Analysis by Scale of Operation 
The 1978  survey was conducted by Kasetsart University staff members (including the authors) 
for a study on the "Socioeconomic  Conditions of Coastal Fishermen",  which was supported finan- 
cially by the International Development Research Centre of Canada. Four coastal provinces, Chump- 
hon, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Trat and Phangnga were then selected as a cross-section representation 
of coastal fisheries in Thailand. Geographically, the four project sites were so selected that two, 
Chumphon and Nakhon Si Thammarat, are located on the west coast of the Gulf of Thailand; Trat, 
on the east coast and Phangnga on the Andaman Sea coast. Religion was also a factor in selecting 
the four provinces: Chumphon and Trat consist of purely Buddhist communities, Phangnga is 
predominantly Muslim and Nakhon is mixed. In terms of level of development the fisheries of 
Nakhon and Phangnga are smaller in scale and more primitive in technology than the other two. A 
total sample of 891  households was drawn randomly from predominantly fishing villages. Data were 
collected on catch and effort, costs and prices, fishing and non-fishing employment and assets, 
incomes and expenditures and several sociodemographic variables including occupational and 
geographic mobility. 
Scale is defined in terms of current value of fishing assets: fishing units with fishing assets 
valued at less than 20,000 baht in 1978  were classified as small scale while those with more than 
20,000 baht were classified as medium scale and those with assets worth over 100,000 baht as large 
scale. The Department of Fisheries uses length of vessel as a criterion of scale: vessels under 14  m in 
length but excluding trawls, purse nets, purse seines are classified as small scale, the rest large scale. 
The two definitions, of course, may give rise to different results regarding the numbers and economic 
conditions of small-scale fishermen. While the surveys and background studies to this chapter were based on the "asset"  definition of scale and the results presented here in that format, it would be 
useful to  translate the results, to the extent possible, into the DOF definition of scale. This is done 
later in this section. 
Table 6.1 presents the cost structure of the coastal fishery by province and scale of operation 
Unlike the large-scale fishery (assets above 100,000 baht) where fixed costs (depreciation and 
interest on capital) often dominate, in the coastal fishery, which includes both small and medium 
scale (including otter trawlers under 14  m), fixed costs rarely exceed 15%  of total costs. Labor costs 
are relatively more important, especially in the small-scale fishery where they range between 29 and 
41% of total costs reflecting the labor intensity of the coastal fishery. It should be noted, however, 
that these labor costs are not actually paid expenses for hired labor but imputed opportunity costs 
for family labor, unlike the labor costs of the medium- and large-scale fisheries. Labor is most 
important in the small-scale fishery of Phangnga where capital accounts for only 8%  of total cost. 
Fuel is an important cost item accounting for 14  to 42% but not as important as in the large-scale 
trawl fishery where it accounts for over 50% of total costs. Least fuel-intensive are the small-scale 
fishing vessels in Chumphon, Trat and Phangnga, some of which are non-mechanized, while most 
fuel intensive are the medium-scale trawlers of Trat which venture into Kampuchean waters. 
Most striking are differences in the cost of borrowed capital (see Table 6.1). In Phangnga 
which is predominantly Muslim and in Trat which has well-developed institutional credit by virtue 
of its proximity to Bangkok, the interest rates paid by fishermen, small and medium scale alike, 
were in line with the institutional rates of interest paid by the large-scale trawl fishery. In Chump- 
hon and Nakhon the coastal fishermen borrowed mainly from informal sources which charged them 
interest rates three to  five times as high as those charged by banks. The interest rate ceiling of 12% 
imposed on bank loans by the government, ostensibly to help poor farmers and fishermen, dries up 
rural credit which is generally more costly and forces fishermen to borrow from fish traders and 
middlemen at high interest rates often hidden in preemptive marketing arrangements. This is a 
Table 6.1. Cost structure, debt and current capital cost by scale of operation, four coastal provinces, Thailand, 1978. 
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Source :  Panayotou et al. (1985) based on the 1978 survey. particularly restrictive constraint for coastal fishermen who borrow up to 50% of their fishing 
capital which ranged between 4,600 baht for the small-scale fishery in Phangnga to 55,000 baht for 
the medium-scale fishery in Trat (see Table 6.1). The latter, however, borrows only 23% of its 
capital because it generates sufficient profits for reinvestment from its operation in the lightly 
exploited Kampuchean waters. 
Table 6.2 reports the revenues, costs and returns for the coastal fishery, again by province and 
scale of operation. Revenues ranged between 35,000 baht in the small-scale fisheries of Chumphon, 
Nakhon and Phangnga to 250,000 baht in the medium-scale fishery of Chumphon and 360,000 baht 
in the medium-scale fishery of Trat. Costs were equally varied ranging between 17,000 baht in the 
small-scale fishery of Nakhon and 200,000 baht in the medium-scale fishery of Trat. Imputed costs 
(the part of the cost that is incurred but not paid out in cash because it involves the use of owned 
inputs such as family labor and capital) ranged between 36 and 48% of total costs for the small-scale 
fishery and 19  to 25% for the medium-scale fishery (see Table 6.2). As we would expect, the larger 
the scale of a fishing operation the less it relies on its own factors of production and more on hired 
labor and borrowed capital. 
Gross family income defined as revenues minus cash costs, is the maximum income that the 
household can consume in the short run. It is not sustainable over the long run since no allowance 
for the depreciation of fishing assets is made. Gross family income ranged between 16,000 baht 
earned by small-scale fishermen in Nakhon to almost 200,000 earned by medium-scale fishermen in 
Trat. Net family income, which allows for depreciation and therefore is sustainable over the long 
run, was only marginally lower than gross income because of the low capital intensity of the coastal 
fishery. By comparison to a national average of 8,390 baht per capita (see NESDB 1977,1981)  and 
assuming no other source of income, the small- and medium-scale fishermen to Nakhon were worse 
off than the average Thai citizen. The small-scale fishermen in the other three provinces earned net 
incomes comparable to the national average. The medium-scale fishermen of Chumphon and Trat 
were substantially better off than the average Thai citizen. 
Table 6.2. Annual revenues, costs and returns (@ x lo3)  per coastal fishing unit by type of technology in four prov- 
inces, Thailand, 1978. 
Location/ 


















Cash  Imputed  Total 
Incomea 
Gross  Net 
profitb 
Gross  Net 
Return  Return 
to  to 
Resource  capital  labor 
rents  %  (@/day) 
Source :  Panayotou et al. (1985) based on the 1978 survey. Gross profits, defined as the difference between revenues and variable (operating) costs, were 
positive for both small- and medium-scale vessels  as groups, ensuring their continued operation over 
the short run since all operating costs were covered. Similarly net profits, defined as gross profit 
minus fixed costs, were positive, ensuring continued operation over the long run as well. Pure profits 
or resource rents, obtained as the difference between net profits and the opportunity cost of 
management (that is, what owner-operators could earn by hiring out their managerial skills approxi- 
mated here by the average earnings of hired skippers), were positive for both groups in all locations 
except for small-scale fishermen in Trat. The opportunity cost of management as an imputed cost 
is relevant to all fishing units regardless of capital or management intensity, but admittedly operators 
of large and modem vessels and gear have more marketable management skills. Here, we assume that 
the opportunity costs of management vary only across locations but not across gear types. How- 
ever, in most cases, these rents were not substantial enough to refute the hypothesis that the fishery 
had reached a bionomic equilibrium. The only exceptions were the medium-scale fishermen of 
Chumphon and Trat who earned 94,000 and 147,000 baht in rents, respectively. 
The return to capital was highest in Phangnga where many vessels are non-powered and have 
very low capital cost and in Trat for medium-scale vessels which earned the highest resource rents 
because of their operation in the rich fishing grounds of neighboring Kampuchea. In the latter case, 
however, a very high return is necessary to compensate for the substantially higher risk of loss of 
life and vessel borne by encroaching fishermen. However, returns to capital are high for all gear 
groups in all locations, even for those with negative resource rents because of the very low capital 
cost involved in coastal fishing. For this reason, the concept of return to capital makes little sense in 
the case of small-scale fisheries. 
More appropriate is the concept of return to labor, since coastal fishing is a labor-intensive 
activity. Fishermen and other members of their family engaged in coastal fishing earned daily wages 
of 21 to 100  baht. The minimum daily wage for unskilled labor in 1978  in southem Thailand was 
35 baht. Since fishermen are not totally unskilled and also tend to face higher risk at sea than do 
unskilled laborers on land, they are expected to earn over 35 baht a day. Medium-scale fishermen in 
Chumphon and Trat and small-scale  fishermen in Phangnga did, but the rest did not. Most unsatis- 
factory were the wages of fishermen in Nakhon, small and medium scale alike, which averaged 
22 baht per day. This is a reflection of both the low profitability of fishing in Nakhon and the lack 
of alternative employment opportunities. 
As in the case of the trawl fishery, averages may be misleading when variances are large. Table 
6.3 breaks down these averages by type of gear. While on the average, coastal fishermen had positive 
incomes and profits, fish gill nets in Trat had negative income and both fish gill nets in Trat and 
push nets in Phangnga had negative gross profits and would have been better off not operating at all 
even in the short run since they did not cover their operating costs. In the long run, in addition to 
these two groups of gears, trawl nets in Chumphon were also unprofitable and hence economically 
non-viable since they failed to cover their fixed costs in addition to variable costs. When the oppor- 
tunity cost of management was deducted from net profits three additional types of gear turned out 
to earn negative resource rents: crab gill net in Chumphon and Phangnga and winged set bag in 
Nakhon. In total, six gear groups, at least one in each location, had negative rents, which if they 
persist over the long run would imply geographic and/or occupational immobility. 
It is of interest to examine how sensitive our results are to the particular definition of scale 
used by reassemblmg the 1978  survey data according to the definition of scale: small-scale fisheries 
are those which are carried out by small fishing gears operating on a subsistence basis from vessels 
less than 14  m in length with engines not greater than 30 hp deployed in the vicinity of the home 
base with mostly family labor on board; trawls, push nets, purse seines, mackerel gill nets and even 
bamboo traps are excluded regardless of size. This leaves only non-powered gear, cast nets, lift nets, 
winged set bags, crab traps, non-mackerel gill nets and other traditional fish catching devices, to be 
included in small-scale fisheries. The economies of these individual gear types are given in Table 6.3. 
When the 1978  survey data were reassembled based on the DOF definition of scale and aggre- 
gated into a "small-scale"  fishery group the results were not significantly different from those 
obtained earlier based on "our"  definition of scale (and, thefore, they are not repeated here). This is 
hardly surprising. In Chumphon, the two definitions give rise to the same classification of fishing 
units and, therefore, no differences in the results should be expected. A small difference arises for Table 6.3. Profitability per fishing unit by selected types of technology. four coastal provinces. Thailand. 1978. 
-  -  -  --  - - 
Gmss  Net  Pure profit  Return  Ret- 
Technology  Fishing  Gross  f-y  family  Operating  Net  (economic  to capitala  to labor 
(Type of  gear)  months  revenues  income  income  profit  profit  rent)  (%)  (%) 
Chumphon 
Cast net (S) 
Shrimp gill net (S) 
Crab gill net (S) 
Fish gill net (M) 
Push  net (M) 
Purse seine (MI 
Trawl net (M) 
Nakhon 
Lift net (S) 
Winged set bag (5) 
Shrimp giu net (S) 
Trawl net (S) 
Push net (M) 
No~powered  (S) 
Push net (S) 
Wiwed set bag (S) 
Crab gill net (S) 
Shrimp giU net (S) 
Txat 
Crab trap (S) 
Fiah gill net (S) 
Shrbnp gill net (S) 
Crab gill net (S) 
Push  net (M) 
Trawl net (M) 
S = anal3 wale. M = medium scale. 
;orilinal  cost of  capital. 
Family labor. 
Source  :  Panayotou et 81.  (1985) based on the 1983  survey. 
Nakhon, Phangnga and Trat where trawl nets, push nets and fish gill nets, respectively, were included 
under our definition of scale and are now excluded under the DOF definition. Since all these three 
types of gear were doing worse than the average gear in the group, in terms of return to both labor 
and capital, their exclusion from the group would raise rather than lower the average profitability of 
the small-scale fishery. Therefore, our results overestimate somewhat the plight and numbers of 
small-scale fishermen compared to the results on the official classification of scale. However, the 
difference is small because the sample (and population) size of push nets in Phangnga and fish gill 
nets in Trat is very small and the performance of trawl nets in Nakhon, which are more numerous, 
diverges only marginally from that of the group as a whole. 
Thus, it matters little which definition of scale is adopted, at least for the sample and time 
frame of this study. What matters more is that any assistance towards the sector should not be 
indiscriminate for the entire coastal fishery but targeted to benefit those in need of  assistance to 
improve their fishing performance or to move to other more profitable activities. 
Analysis by Fishing Community: Changes Over Time 
In order to investigate the persistence of rents (whether positive or negative) and the extent of 
mobility in and out of the fisheries, in 1983  we carried out a survey of a subsample of the 1978 
survey. Table 6.4 presents a comparative picture of fishing, non-fishing and total income per house- 
hold in seven villages in Chumphon, during 1978 and 1983. The average fishing income per house- 
hold in Chumphon dropped from 25,600 baht in 1978  to 23,600 in 1983, an 8%  decline in nominal 
termssr a 45% decline in real terms (the consumer price index rose by over 40% during the period). 
This decline was not uniform across the seven villages; in fact, in three out of seven fishing incomes 
rose substantially, but the decline in the other four was sufficiently strong to average in an overall 
decline. In contrast, non-fishing incomes rose in all villages except one. On the average non-fishing 
incomes rose by 165%  in nominal terms or by 59% in real terms. 
The total household income averaged 32,000 baht in 1978 and 40,000 in 1983,  a 25% increase 
in nominal terms or a 25% decline in real terms despite a 17.5% increase in effort (measured in 
man-days of work). Moreover, there has been a change in the composition of total household 
income; in 1983  only 60% was derived from fishing compared to 80% in 1978. Overall, the sampled 
fishing villages of Chumphon in 1983,  were on the average poorer and less dependent on fishing than 
five years earlier. The cause behind this rise in poverty was clearly the decline in the profitability of 
fishing. As seen from Table 6.5 the fishing wage rate declined by 3.5% while the non-fishing wage 
rate (that is, the opportunity cost of fishing) rose by 54%,  both in nominal terms. These develop- 
ments amount to a 93% drop in fishery resource rents from 30 baht per man-day in 1978  to 2 baht 
per man-day in 1983;  that is, by 1983  virtually all rents were dissipated. In only two villages did 
fishermen earn positive rents. In the other five they suffered considerable losses ranging from 4 to 
36 baht per man-day. 
How much shifting to other occupations took place in response to the diminished profitability 
of fishing vis8-vis non-fishing occupations? Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show that a 3.5% reduction in the 
fishing wage rate is associated with a 4.3% reduction in the number of man-days devoted to fishing 
by the household. On the other hand, a 54% increase in the non-fishing wage rate corresponds to a 
76% increase in the number of man-days devoted to non-fishing activities. These changes imply a 
mobility "elasticity"  (percentage change in working hours over percentage change in wage) of 1.23 
for fishing and 1.41 for non-fishing, that is, there was substantial, though not infinite, mobility out 
Table 6.4.  Changes in  fishing.  non-fishing  and total incomes (average per household, in baht) between 1978 and  1983 in selected 
villages in the Muang District. Chumphon Province, Thailand. 
Subdistrict1  Sample  Fishing incomea (baht)  Non-fishing incomea (baht)  Total income 
village  size  1978  1983  %A  1978  1983  %A  1978  1983  % A 
Village 2  3  13.918  20.280  45.7  7,800  20.000  156.4  21,718  40.280  85.5 
(15,435)~ (13.595)  (7,275)  (18.330) 
Village 3  2  22,324  17,064  -23.6  14.356  11.550  -19.5  36,679  28,614  -22.0 
(19.341)  (7,161)  (6,852)  (3,818) 
Village 5  7  18,230  35.511  9.48  3,193  23,916  649.0  21.423  58.707  174.8 
(14.593)  (26,623)  (2,554)  (29.708) 
Village 7  3  26.430  56,511  113.8  12,583  14,600  16.0  39,013  71.111  82.3 
(28,289)  (44,768)  (2,184)  (22,491) 
Natoong 
Village 3  14  34.205  16,702  -51.2  4.977  10,312  107.2  39.182  27,014  -31.1 
(27.413)  (10.500)  (6.156)  (11.729) 
Village 4  7  27,667  21,960  -20.3  2,490  8.135  229.3  30.037  30.095  0.2 
(22,026)  (23,612)  (1.748)  (7.622) 
Total  44  25.589  23.641  -7.6  6,066  16.054  164.6  31.655  39,695  25.4 
%et  of depreciation and opportunity cost of capital. 
b~igures  in parentheses are standard deviations from the mean. 
% A  :  Percentage change between 1978 and 1983. 
Source  :  Panayotou and Panayotou (1985) based on the 1978 and 1983 surveys. Table 6.5. Changes in  fishing, non-fishing and  total wage  and resoume rents (average per household) between 1978  and 1983,  in 
selected dlages in the Muang District, Chumphon Province, Thailand. 
Fishing   on-fishinga 
Subdistrict1  Sample  wage (baht /man-day)  wage (bahtlman-day  Average wage  "Rents" 











4ncludes farming, hired labor, mining, retail trade, construction, etc. 
Source  :  Panayotou and Panayotou (1985)  based on the 1978  and 1983  surveys. 
Table 6.6.  Changes in fishing, non-fishing and total employment per household between 1978  and 1983  in selected villages in Chum- 
phon Province, Thailand. 
-  -  -- -- - - 
Fishing  Non-fishing  Total 
Subdistrict  Sample  employment (man-days  employment (man-days  employment (man-days 











a~igures  in parentheses are standard deviations from the mean. 
% A  :  Percentage change between 1978  and 1983. 
Source  :  Panayotou and Panayotou (1985)  based on the 1978  and 1983  surveys. of the fishery and into other occupations. Geographic mobility, however, was considerably more 
limited except for temporary outmigration of hired fishing labor to other southern provinces with 
better employment opportunities (see Panayotou and Panayotou 1985). 
Table 6.7 presents a comparative picture of income levels in 1978  and 1983  in another prov- 
ince, Phangnga on the Andaman Sea. The average fishing household income which was 26,500 
bahtlyear in 1978 (compared to 25,600 in Chumphon) fell only slightly to 26,300 baht in 1983 
which amounted to a decline of over 40% in real terms. Of  the five sampled villages only one had 
experienced a rise in real fishing incomes while three villages suffered a decline in both real and 
nominal incomes. Non-fishing incomes have suffered a decline in all five villages averaging 53% in 
nominal terms or 72% in real terms. As a result, the percentage of total household income derived 
from fishing rose from 53  to 71%. Total annual household income declined from 50,000 baht in 
1978 to 37,000 baht in 1983, a 25% decline in nominal terms or a 54% decline in real terms. 
The decline of fishing income in Phangnga was strictly the result of a reduction in fishing 
employment rather than of the wage rate which rose 21% between 1978  and 1983  (Table 6.8). As 
shown in Table 6.9 the number of man-days devoted to fishing was reduced by 19%  implying either 
a perverse response to the higher (nominal) fishing wages or the absence of money illusion since real 
fishing wage dropped by 27%. Non-fishing employment was reduced even more, by 33%,  in response 
to  a 32% decline in the nominal non-fishing wage rate. This decline in the non-fishing wage rate was 
largely due to the slump of the tin mining industry. 
The average nominal wage rate from all activities of the sampled households remained un- 
changed between 1978  and 1983  but in real terms it fell by 40% "inducing"  a 25% reduction in 
labor supply by the household (Table 6.9). As a result of the rise in nominal fishing wages and the 
steep decline of non-fishing wages, resource rents from fishing rose substantially, from 4 baht per 
man-day in 1978  to 50 baht in 1983,  although in one village they continued to be negative and in 
another negligible. Again, labor mobility appears to be considerable but the response in Phangnga 
Table 6.7. Changes in fishing, non-fishing and  total  incomes (average per household) between 1978 and 1983 in 
sele-cted villages in the Muang District, Phangnga Province, Thailand. 
Sample  Fishing income (baht)a  Non-fishing (baht)a  Total income (baht)' 
size  1978  1983  9%  A  1978  1983  %A  1978  1983  %A 
Punyee 
Village 1  5 
Village 2  26 
Village 3  17 
Bangtae 
Village 5  4 
Village 6  21 
Total  73 
a~et  of depreciation and opportunity cost of capital. 
b~igures  in parentheses are standard deviations from the mean, 
% A  :  Percentage change between 1978 and 1983. 
Source :  Panayotou and Panayotou (1985)  based on the 1978 and 1983 surveys. Table 6.8.  Changes in fishing, non-fishing and total wage rate and resource rents (average per household) between 1978  and 1983,  in 
selected villages in Muang District of Phangnga Province, Thailand. 
Sample  Fishing  Non-fishing  Wage rate (baht /manday)  "Rents"  (baht /--day) 









Source  :  Panayotou and Panayotou (1985)  based on the 1978  and 1983  surveys. 
Table 6.9.  Changes  in fishing, non-fishing and total employment per household between 1978 and 1983, selected 
villages, Phangnga Province, Thailand. 
Fishing  Non-fishing  Total 
Subdistrict/  Sample  employment (man-days)  employment (man-days)  employment (man-days) 









a~igures  in parentheses are standard deviations from the mean. 
% A  :  Percentage change between 1978  and 1983. 
Source :  Panayotou and Panayotou (1985) based on  the 1978  and 1983  surveys. appears to be more to changes in real rather than nominal incomes. It is also of interest to note that 
the large disparity of 18,400 baht between Chumphon and Phangnga in 1978  was reduced to 2,400 
baht in 1983. 
In conclusion, the rents from fishing were dissipated in Chumphon and regenerated in Phangnga 
not as much because of the change in the profitability of fishing (which in real terms declined in 
both locations) as from the change in the profitability of non-fishing alternatives. This contrasts 
with the large-scale trawl fishery where rents were dissipated mainly as a result of rising fuel costs 
and depleted resource stocks and were regenerated through technological adjustments and expan- 
sion to new fishing grounds farther offshore. As we have seen earlier, small-scale fishermen lack 
access to low-cost credit to upgrade their technology and, hence are confined to the relatively fixed 
coastal fishing grounds. As a result, their incomes depend on the competition over these grounds 
and the availability and profitability of non-fishing alternatives in the surrounding area. Unlike the 
large-scale fishermen whose incomes rise in direct proportion with the rents from fishing, small-scale 
fishermen's total income may decline with a rise in rents if  the latter is more the result of a decline 
in the profitability of their non-fishing employment rather than of an increase in the profitability of 
fishing. Thus, rents and poverty are compatible, especially for small-scale fishermen whose opportu- 
nity costs are very low. A further decline may create rents from fishing but these are rents of 
poverty not wealth; what should matter is the total real income not nominal increases of one source 
"at the expense" of another. CHAPTER 7 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
To recapitulate, the calculation of revenues, cost and returns in Chapters 3 and 4 yielded the 
following results: (1)  the returns to fishing vary widely, among both large- and small-scale fishermen, 
depending, in the first case, on size of vessel and type of gear and, in the second, on location and 
type of gear; (2)  the large-scale fishery is, on the average, far more profitable because of its resilience 
to changing economic and biological conditions; (3) among the different vessel-classes the large 
otter trawlers and small pair trawlers, being the most resilient groups, continued to be profitable 
while the numerous small otter trawlers steadily lost ground to  the point of negative returns in 1977; 
and (4) small-scale fishermen combine a variety of fishing and non-fishing occupations to earn, on 
the average, a subsistence income, somewhat lower than the average rural income in the country. 
The economic theory of open-access resource exploitation (reviewed in Chapter 4) predicts 
that: (1)  in the absence of barriers to entry, resource rents (revenues in excess of the opportunity 
cost of fishing inputs) would attract new entrants; and (2)  entry, under static biological and eco- 
nomic conditions, tends to reduce and in the long run eliminate these rents allowing labor and 
capital to  earn no more than their opportunity costs. As a corollary, fishermen operating in regulated 
fisheries are expected to earn some rents if  the latter are not taxed by the government. To what 
extent is the described situation of the Thai fisheries in agreement with these predictions? Does 
either the absence of rents in the small-scale fishery (despite the regulation of access to coastal 
waters) or the long-term persistence of rents in the large-scale fishery (despite the open access status 
of the noncoastal resources) constitute a refutation of economic theory? Are not 20 years of rapid 
growth of the industry sufficient to deplete rents? Should not one at least observe a gradual decline 
in these rents over time as effort expands? 
The first point to be made is that the available information of a few points in time, some under 
exceptional circumstances, does not suffice to answer these questions conclusively. Second, the 
tumultuous years under study (1960-1982) hardly fit the static world of unchanging economic and 
biological conditions. Environmental parameters have been altered by rising pollution levels in the 
Gulf of Thailand while fish resources expanded through a gradual shift to fishing grounds outside 
the Thai waters. Fuel prices and labor costs have been rising dramatically inducing discrete changes 
in technology. The catch per unit of effort may have been falling as a result of incessant entry 
but fish prices have been rising under domestic population pressures and strong foreign demand. 
These multiple shifts may have overshadowed any tendency towards dissipation of rents due to 
entry as new rents were cxeated (or old ones dissipated) as a result of these developments. 
For the trawl fishery, we have already, in Chapter 5, tested and failed to  reject the first predic- 
tion of the theory that rents would induce entry and losses exit by comparing the time profile of 
registered vessels in each class given in Table 5.4 against that of the rent situation depicted in Table 
5.6. Only in the case of small trawlers did we observe perverse behavior, entry following losses (e.g., 
otter trawlers during 1975-1977) and exit following rents (e.g., pair trawlers 1976-1979). 
Unfortunately, there is no nationwide information on entry into and exit from the small-scale 
fishery. However, based on our survey in two provinces we have concluded that there was consider- 
able mobility between fishing and non-fishing occupations in response to income differentials 
(profits and losses), as long as no change of location was involved. Geographic mobility was rather limited. There was considerable outmigration to other districts and provinces where seasonal fishing 
was more profitable but on a temporary basis (3-4  months/year). Permanent outmigration or im- 
migration was more in response to social rather than economic factors, e.g., marriage and education. 
The depletion of rents in the coastal fishery of Chumphon and their persistence under open- 
access exploitation are not at odds with the theory. While access to coastal resources is 'regulated' 
(for instance, trawling within 3 km from the shore is prohibited), rules and regulations have not 
been enforced and where they were, their effect was simply to create a new group of rent-claimants 
(the local enforcement officials) and hasten the dissipation of  rents. Despite their mobility the 
trawlers did not abandon the coastal waters altogether for a number of reasons: (a) the coast is rich 
in shrimp and other high-value species; (b) coastal fishing by comparison with distant-water opera- 
tions involves lower traveling and operating costs; and (c) the coast provides supplementary fishing 
grounds for utilization of excess fishing capacity during seasons when offshore fishing is highly risky 
or simply not possible. The escalation of fuel prices and shortages coupled with the increased abun- 
dance of certain coastal species, especially crustaceans, often induces increasing coastal activity by 
trawlers as is evidenced by the increasing frequency of conflicts with coastal fishermen (see Bang- 
kok Post 1979a, 197913). 
One of the anonymous reviewers of the present study commented that it has been observed 
that while the Penaeus stocks have decreased in abundance in the Gulf of Thailand, Metapenaeus 
stocks have increased and that the baby trawlers and push nets have benefited to some extent. 
Unable to extend their fishing range and expand 'seaward',  and with their limited fishing 
grounds being encroached by trawlers, the coastal fishermen often seek supplementary sources of 
income 'landward' which, however, are hard to obtain without initial capital. Inability to convert 
fixed fishing assets to non-fishing capital, as well as educational or emotional attachment to  the 
fishery often result in short-run deviations of incomes from opportunity costs. What appears as 
a continual drift of fishing incomes is a reflection of declining opportunity costs due to increasing 
unemployment and landlessness outside the fishery. Unlike the legendsry open-access fishermen 
who regard resource rents as part of the remuneration for their productive services, it may be said 
that coastal fishermen in Thailand came to regard everything they might get out of the fishery as 
'rent'. 
In contrast, the large-scale fishery, because of  its mobility, even to areas far outside Thai 
coastal waters, and ability to continuously upgrade its technology, managed to  maintain and even 
expand its rent earning position despite the incessant entry into the fishery. The economic theory 
of rent dissipation in openaccess resource exploitation holds over a well-defined, limited resource 
and under static conditions. In the case of the Thai large-scale fishery, technological progress and 
the opening of new fishing grounds proceeded fast enough to more than offset the effect of entry 
on resource rents. As coastal fishing grounds became increasingly crowded, catch declined, and cost 
rose, the large-scale fishery was able to upgrade its technology thus lowering the travel and opera- 
tion cost of distant-water fishing so that new rents were created farther and farther away from the 
coast. 
With ample rents for reinvestment (not to mention the easy credit) and with the government 
unwilling or unable to intervene, the Thai trawling fleet moved into both the open sea and the 
lightly fished and lightly guarded fishing grounds of neighboring countries establishing,  in retrospect, 
historical fishing rights over much of the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea. Given the extent 
of these new fishing grounds and the absence of competing large-scale fisheries (with the possible 
exception of Taiwan), the continuing entry on the part of Thailand alone is not likely to dissipate 
the rents in distant-water fishing as long as technological progress continues to  keep costs down and 
growing demand maintains the upward trend of fish prices. 
The vulnerability of these rents to general economic conditions, as well as the fishing industry's 
ability to make the necessary technological adjustments to cope with them, has been aptly demon- 
strated during the energy crisis of the early 1970s. While after a 138%  rise in fuel prices between 
July 1973  and February 1974,virtually all vessel groups (except for the very large trawlers) incurred 
losses or  just broke even, three years later, in 1977, virtually all (with the exception of small-scale 
trawlers) were making substantial profits despite a new fuel price increase of 13%  in March 1977. 
In conclusion, it could be said that the inshore fishery, as far as the small-scale fishermen and 
small and medium otter trawlers (less than 18 m) are concerned, is overexploited in the economic 
sense of rent dissipation even if temporary rents are occasionally recreated by the depression of non-fishing activities (e.g., tin mining) in remote fishing communities. This eventuality, however, is 
not yet in sight for larger vessels with an ever-expanding fishing range that already stretches from 
the Thai coast though the Andaman and South China Seas to the coasts of India, China and Indo- 
nesia. The large-scale fishery will continue to enjoy healthy rents regardless of the economic condi- 
tions in the rest of the economy as long as neighboring countries lack the capability to enforce 
respect of their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Fish and fuel price fluctuations may affect 
temporarily the profitability of the industry but not its long-term viability. What threatens the long- 
term viability of the fishing industry in Thailand, as we know it, is the increasing capability of 
neighboring countries to both police and exploit their EEZs and Thailand's growing concern over its 
relations with its neighbors who resent the encroachment on their fishing grounds and its interna- 
tional image. Unless Thailand succeeds in negotiating increasing numbers of joint ventures and other 
long-term arrangements with other countries, the Thai fleet sooner or later will have to retreat into 
Thai waters, and its long-term viability will be determined by the state of the Thai fishery resources. CHAPTER 8 
THE STATE OF THE RESOURCES 
Before considering the prospects of the fishery (Chapter 9), it is necessary to examine the 
state of the Thai fishery resources on which the future of the industry inevitably depends. A given 
fish stock is said to be biologically overfished (underfished) if  the annual catch exceeds (falls short 
of) the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) or maximum net natural growth. The latter depends on 
environmental conditions, such as food availability, temperature, salinity, currents, as well as the 
biological traits of and interaction among the species of which the stock is composed. While eco- 
nomic underexploitation (operation of a fishery below the level that maximizes rents) precludes 
biological overfishing, rent dissipation does not necessarily imply biological overfishing nor does the 
presence of rents preclude it (Fig. 5.1). It is, therefore, of interest to examine whether the fishery 
resources have been optimally exploited in both the biological and economic sense. 
Earlier biological evidence (SCS 1973a) indicates that the inshore (< 50 m deep) zone of the 
Gulf of Thailand has been overfished since 1966-1967  with the 1970s catch being 605,000 t com- 
pared to an MSY  of only 447,000 t. The reverse was true of the offshore zone (50-500 m deep) 
where only 49,000 t were caught out of an MSY of 164,000 t. The inshore catches of the early 
1970s did not involve biological overfishing by comparison with the new estimates of MSY. How- 
ever, by 1973  the inshore catch reached 803,000 t which is indicative of overfishing not only when 
compared to the MSY  but also when the declining catches in subsequent years are considered 
(although economic factors such as the oil crisis are at least partly responsible for the fall in catches 
during 1974-1975). Further, it has been estimated that the 1972 level of 6.7 x lo6  standard (research 
ves'sel), fishing hours would have sufficed to catch the MSY while actual fishing effort exceeded 8.5 
x lo6 hours in 1973 and continued to exceed 7.5 x lo6  hours in 1975 (Table 8.1). The SCS (1978b) 
results have been corroborated by further reestimations (Boonyubol and Hongskul1976 and 1977; 
Pauly 1979; Boonyubol1979) the most recent of which employed 1961-1977 data to arrive at an 
MSY of 685,684 t per annum and a corresponding optimal effort of 6.4 x lo6  standard fishing 
hours. The demersal catch in 1977 reached 875,360 t with a fishing effort of 9.6 x lo6 standard 
hours. 
As for the offshore resources of the Gulf, the earlier (SCS 1973a)  result that they are biologi- 
cally underfished has been corroborated by the newer SCS (197813) study as only 28,000 t were 
caught in 1972 and 61,000 t in 1975 compared to the estimated MSY  of 127,000 t (Table 8.1) al- 
though the latter estimate is considerably below the 1973 estimate of 164,000 t. Finally, in the 
Straits of Malacca (including the relevant portions of the Andaman Sea), the combined catch of 
about 428,000 t was judged approximately equal to the estimated MSY  of the area as a whole. A 
similar study (SCS 1973b)  of the pelagic resources infe&ed from fragmentary evidence that some 
pelagic species such as the Indo-Pacific mackerel were underfished at.the time. 
Three subsequent studies (SCS 1976,1978aY  1978b) based on longer time series of catch and 
effort by commercial and research vessels, with appropriate adjustments for catches outside the 
Thai waters, have produced a more complete and, hopefully, more accurate 
fish resources. Their results, with some ramifications, are summarized in 
fish resources of Thailand extending over an area of 350,000 km2 are found to total a virgin bio- 
mass (in the absence of fishing) of 1,810,000 t with a mean density of 5.2 t/km2.  More than two- 
thirds of this biomass is contributed by the 179,000 km2 of the inshore (< 50 m deep) zone of the 45 
Table 8.1. The demersal and pelagic fish resources of Thailand. 
Demersal fish resources  Pelagic fish resources 
Gulf of Thailand  Andaman  Gulf of  Andaman 




Virgin biomass, B,,  (t) 
Maximum sustainable 
yield, MSY (t) 
Effort for MSY (hr)a 
Peak catch 
-  Year (up to 
1975) 
-  Catch (t) 
-  Effort (hr) 
Peak effort 
-  Year 
-  Catch (t) 
-  Effort (hr) 
aIn standard research-vessel fishing hours unless otherwise stated. 
b~alculated  from the corresponding MSY  by assuming the same relationship as in the Gulf of Thailand (50 rn 
deep, i.e., MSYIB,  = 0.482). 
'Calculated  from the corresponding MSY  by assuming the same relationship between MSY and needed effort as 
in the Gulf of Thailand (<  50 m deep, i.e., 96.2 kg/hr). 
Sources:  SCS (1976, 1978a);  Menasveta et al. (1973) and Bahtia et al. (1983) for the pelagic resources of the Gulf 
of Thailand and the Andaman Sea, respectively. 
Gulf which has mean density of 7.4 t of fish/km2 compared to 2.1 t/km2 of the offshore zone, and 
4.9 t/km2 of the Andaman Coast. 
In terms of MSY, these studies estimated that 641,000 t could be caught on a sustained basis 
from the inshore zone of the Gulf, 127,000 t from the offshore zone and about 200,000 t from the 
Andaman Sea. Thus, earlier studies may have underestimated the potential catch from the inshore 
zone. The SCS (1978b) MSY estimate of 200,000 t for the demersal resources of the Thai portion 
of the Andaman Sea indicates that some overfishing incurred as early as 1969  when 216,000 t were 
landed. In contrast, the pelagic resources as appraised by SCS (1976) and SCS (1978a) continue to 
be underexploited especially those of the Gulf's East Coast and of the Andaman Sea (see Table 8.1). 
Related indications of the advancing depletion of the demersal resources in the Gulf of Thai- 
land have been the rapidity with which the catch per unit of effor't (CPUE) fell and the composition 
of catch changed since the introduction of trawlers. Table 8.2 and Fig. 8.1 show that the catch per 
hour of the research vessel Pramong 11, operating in the Gulf of Thailand fell steeply during the 
1961-1966 period of massive entry of trawlers (interval B in the figure). It levelled off when entry 
was halted and fishing into international waters began during 1966-1969  (interval C) and declined 
sharply again during the rapid entry of 1969-1972 (interval D). The exit of vessels following the 
1973-1974 oil crisis halted further declines in CPUE until 1977. The precipitous rise in the number 
of trawlers in 1976 and 1977 precipitated no more declines in CPUE as the fleet did not exceed its 
peak 1973  size until some time in mid-1977. Moreover, at least some of the new vessels, especially 
the larger ones, were directed towards distant-water fishing grounds. The catch per hour of the 
research vessel in 1977  was only 16%  of its 1961  volume (obtained with the use of a commercial 
trawler), and in 1982 dropped to 13%  (see Table 8.2). 
A marked change in the composition of catch towards a greater percentage of trash fish and a 
smaller percentage of edible fish as well as larger percentage of cephalopods (squid, cuttlefish and 
octopus) among the latter may be indicative of past (and present) overfishing of the edible species if Table 8.2. Demersal catch, catch per unit of effort and comparison of proportion of trash fish between commercial 
fleet and research vessel (Pramong 11), Gulf of Thailand, 1960-1982. 
Year 
Commercial catch 
Total  Trash fish 
(t)  (%I 
Pramong I1 research vessel 
Average catch  Edible fish  Trash fish 
(kglhr)  (n)  ('%I 
n.a.  = not available. 
'For  1962. 
b~reliminary  data. 
Source :  Boonyubol  and  Pramokchutima (1979) and Phasuk (1978). The proportion of  trash  fish  in  the corn- 
rnercial  catch was obtained  by  dividing the commercial catch by the sum of quantities of fish used for 
fishmeal, fertilizer, fish sauce and 'other' as recorded in the Fisheries Record of Thailand, Table 2. 
11,250 -  1,500 r 
10,500  -  350  -  I@  -  No. trawlers 
9,750  -  1,300 - 
9,000  -  300-  1,200- 
0  + 
4,500  -  150 -  600  - 
500  -  3,750  - 
3,000 -  I00 -  400  - 
2,250 -  300  - 
1,500-  50-  200- 
1958  60  62  64  66  68  70  72  74  76  78  80  82 
Year 
Fig. 8.1. Time trends in the number of trawlers, catch per hour and total dernersal catch in the Gulf of 
Thailand, 1958-1982. not of the total biomass as well. The results of the research vessel surveys underestimate the propor- 
tion of trash fish in the total catch and distort its time trend because of the larger and fixed (4  cm) 
cod-end mesh size of the trawler net used by the research vessel compared to the variable, less than 
2.5 cm mesh size of the commercial trawlers. The latter is sensitive to economic parameters such as 
the prices of fish and fuel and hence the proportion of trash fish (consisting of the juveniles of 
edible fish and smaller non-edible species) may change independently of biological parameters and 
in turn effect a change in them. In 1977, the proportion of trash fish in the research vessel catch 
was only 29% compared to 47% for the commercial fleet as a whole (Table 8.2) and 63% for the 
commercial trawlers (see Table 5.3). 
Table 8.2 presents conflicting time trends in the proportion of trash fish in the total catch 
from research and commercial vessels (due partly to different definitions of trash fish), but, on 
balance, the evidence suggests an increasing trend up to 1974 and a rather ambiguous trend there- 
after. The most pronounced changes among vessel classes were the decrease in the proportion of 
trash fish among large otter board trawlers from 71% in 1974  to 60% in 1977 and the increase for 
the small pair trawlers from 56% in 1974 to 87%  in 1977 (see Table 5.5 and DOF 1979a). Inciden- 
tally, these two classes fared best in terms of return during 1977 (see Table 5.6) for different but 
not dissimilar reasons. Both were exploiting a new resource: the former, new fishing grounds 
outside the Thai waters; the latter, the booming stocks of  squid and cuttlefish. It is, however, 
difficult to ascertain to what extent the changes in the composition of the catch were the result of 
changes in the composition of the stocks due to overfishing and/or expansion into new fishing 
grounds and to what extent they were the result of a deliberate choice by fishermen to discard more 
(or less) trash fish at sea. 
The latter development is part of an ongoing process of changing relative abundance of indi- 
vidual fish populations within the multispecies fisheries of the Gulf of Thailand under the ecological 
impact of small meshes and intense fishing effort. Marr et al. (1976) reported that striking changes 
occurred between 1963 and 1972 in the number and identity of the dominant species or groups of 
species in the catch from the Gulf of Thailand: catfish, rays and slipmouth fell from 9.21,12.66 
and 34.41% of the catch, respectively to 1.51,0.94 and 6.60%, while jacks, lizard fish and thread- 
fin bream rose from 2.60,1.56 and 4.44%, respectively to 7.02, 7.14 and 7.86%. Even more specta- 
cular was the increase in the percentage of squid itom less than 1%  in 1963  to over 27% in 1972 
(Marr et al. 1976).  An even more dramatic upsurge in the stocks of squid and other cephalopods has 
been observed which resulted in an almost doubling of their catch between 1976 and 1977 (DOF, 
1977).  Such developments not only are indicative of overfishing of the predators and/or competitors 
of the 'booming'  species, but may also render overly optimistic the estimates of MSY  based on 
'overall biomass/overall effort' data which ignore the between-species interactions as Pauly (1979) 
convincingly argued on the basis of evidence from the Gulf of Thailand. 
While estimates of MSY  based on aggregate biomass are less than satisfactory in the case of 
multispecies tropical fisheries, a more appropriate model is lacking for estimating the potential and 
evaluating the current state of the resources. Pauly (1979) and Panayotou (1982) proposed sonie 
alternatives which are not yet sufficiently operational to be used in this study. We  will instead, use 
the conventional approach of estimating MSY  for the tstal biomass of the Gulf of.Thailand. This 
approach admittedly ignores interspecies interaction. This is to update earlier estimates of MSY in 
the light of more recent observations. 
A Schaefer-type sustainable yield function was used to obtain estimates of the MSY  for two 
different mesh sizes, 2.5 cm and 4 cm, using 1963-1982  data. Two alternative mesh sizes are used to 
account for the difference in mesh size between the commercial fleet (2.5 cm) and the research 
vessel (4  cm), since the catch data come from the commercial fleet while the catch per unit of effort 
data come from the research vessel. The estimated equation is a parabolic function of the form: 
where Y is catch and E is standardized fishing effort, while a and b are parameters to be estimated. 
,  Estimations for  the two mesh sizes were derived by first dividing equation (1) by effort to 
obtain the catch per unit of effort (CPUE) as a function of  effort and using the CPUE of the re- 
search vessel to standardize commercial vessel effort. We  then regressed CPUE on standardized effort to obtain estimates of the parameters a and b. The following results were obtained for mesh 
sizes of 4 cm and 2.5 cm, respectively. 
- 
R2 = 0.95,  F = 382,  D.W.  = 1.66,  N = 20 
- 
R2 = 0.96,  F = 3.99,  D.W.  = 2.64,  df = 20 
where E~  is the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom, F is the F-ratio, D.W. 
is the Durbin-Watson statistic for autocorrelation, and df are degrees of freedom. The figures in 
parentheses are t-ratios. Based on these statistics the fit of the model is very good: one variable, E, 
and its square explain over 95% of the annual variation in the catch. All coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level and the D.W.  statistic indicates absence of autocorrelation. Based on 
these estimates we have calculated the maximum sustainable yield and the corresponding level of 
effort using equations (6) and (5) of our theoretical framework (Chapter 4), i.e., MSY  = a2/4b and 
EMSY  = a/2b, where a and b are the coefficients of the estimated sustainable yield function above. 
The results are reported and compared with the 1982 levels of catch and effort in Table 8.3. 
The maximum sustainable yield of the demersal fishery of the Gulf of Thailand is found to 
range between 796,000 and 958,000 t depending on the mesh size used. The MSY  level of effort 
ranges between 15.7 and 20.6 x lo6  standard hours, depending on the,mesh size used. The actual 
catch and effort in 1982 were, respectively, 1,000 t and between 19.2 and 25.6 x lo6  hours (de- 
pending on mesh size). Therefore, the demersal fishery resources of the Gulf of Thailand do appear 
to-be  biologically overexploited in the sense of catch and/or effort exceeding significantly their 
MSY 'levels. 
Table 8.3. The maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of the demersal fishery of the Gulf of Thailand and corresponding 
effort at different mesh sizes based on 1963-1982  data and compared to the 1982 situation. 
Mesh size 
Maximum sustainable yield 
Catch  Effort 
(t x lo3)  (St hr x lo6  )a 
1982  situation 
Catch  Effort 
(t  x lo3)  (St hr x 10~)~ 
 illio ion standard hours. 
This result corroborates the findings of earlier studies which, as we have seen, have found that 
the Gulf of Thailand has been overexploited since 1972 when the catch was 738,000 t compared 
with the estimated MSY of 641,000 t. The catch today is 36% higher than in 1972 but also our 
estimate of MSY  is almost 50% higher than earlier estimates. This upward revision of MSY which 
has been done repeatedly as new data became available, casts doubts on the reliability of MSY 
estimates and the usefulness of the concept of MSY  for fisheries management. This is an area which 
calls for further research to arrive at a more suitable model for multispecies fisheries with inter- 
species interaction, 
The discussion thus far has focused on the demersal resources. However, the pelagic resources, 
which contribute about 20% of the catch, suffer from more or less the same level of overexploita- 
tion, at least in the Gulf. The rapid increase of the pelagic catch during 1971-1977 and its steady decline thereafter (Table 5.8) despite the continued rise in effective effort suggests that the pelagic 
resources of the Gulf of Thailand are overexploited, and this could be due to a large extent to their 
vulnerability to fish attraction devices such as the luring purse seines. In contrast, the pelagic fishery 
resources of the Andaman Sea are believed to be underexploited  (Bhatia et al. 1983) although 
the pelagic catch shows a downward trend as well as wide fluctuations. Menasveta et al. (1973) has 
estimated the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of the pelagic resources of the Gulf of Thailand 
to be 365,000 tlyear compared to a 1977 catch of 476,000 t and a 1980 catch of  286,000 t. 
Bhatia et al. (1983) estimated the MSY  of pelagic fish and squid of the Andaman Sea at 71,000 
t/year compared to a 1973  catch of 57,000 t and a 1981  catch of only 14,000 t (see Table 8.1). 
Since the Thai trawl fishery is not confined to the Gulf of Thailand (and the Andaman Sea) 
but operates in the Bay of Bengal-and  the South China Sea, among other areas, it is of interest to 
present a brief account of the state of the resources in these areas. Tables 8.4,8.5 and 8.6 present 
rough estimates of the density, standing stock and mid-1970s landings of both demand and pelagic 
stocks in the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea by area including the Gulf of Thailand. Again, 
these figures are likely to be underestimates and should be regarded with caution. They give, how- 
ever, a rough picture of the relative abundance of the fish stocks in the areas where much of the 
Thai fishing industry has been operating since the early 1970s and continues to operate today. 
Table 8.4.  Fish stocks off Burma and in the Bay of Bengal (above 20'~). 
Standing  Landing  Index of 
Area  Density  stock  (tx  lo3)  fishery 
Subarea  (km2 x lo3)  (t/km2  (t  x lo3)  Potential  Present  expansion 
Burma Coast  250 
Pelagic 
Demersal 
Bay of Bengal  105 
Pelagic 
Demersal 
Source :  Hunting Technical Services Limited (1974). 
Table 8.5. Demersal fish stocks in the South China Sea. 
Standing stock (t  x lo3) 
Areaa  Density  Potential 
Subarea  (km2 x lo3  )  (t/km2  Maximum  Optimum  catch 
Northern Sunda Shelf 
Central Sunda Shelf 
Gulf of Thailand 
Southern Sunda Shelf 
Eastern Sunda Shelf 
Kalimantan Strait 
Total potential catch  2,042 
Present catch  1,308 
Index of fishery expansion  1.56 
aWaters < 200-m deep. 
Source :  Shindo (1973). Table 8.6. Pelagic fish stocks in the South China Sea. 
Standing  Catch  Index of 
Area  Density  stock  (t  x lo3)  fishery 
Subarea  (km2 x lo3  )  (t/km2  )  (t  lo3  )  Potential  Present  expansion 
Off Mekong Delta 
Gulf of Thailand 
East coast of West 
Malaysia 










Index of fishery 
expansion 
Source :  Huntings Technical Services Limited (1974). CHAPTER 9 
OPTIMAL RESOURCE USE 
Having already described the economics of the Thai fishing industry (Chapters 5-7) and the 
state of Thai fishery resources (Chapter 8), it is appropriate now to combine the two within an 
optimizing framework to determine the optimum resource use which should be the objective of 
fisheries management. Such an optimizing framework was provided in Chapter 4. The optimal 
resource use was postulated to be attained at the level of catch and effort that maximize the (sus- 
tainable) economic yield (MEY) or rents from the fishery, that is, the excess of revenues over costs. 
Of course it is always possible to increase current economic rents (profits) beyond this level but, in 
the same way that catch above MSY cannot be sustained for long, profits above MEY cannot be 
sustained for long. Thus, abstracting from adjustment and enforcement costs which could be 
substantial, fisheries management should aim at  the attainment of MEY level of effort as it can be 
shown to be superior to all other levels of effort, including MSY  and open access, in terms of 
returns to a resource in limited supply. The purpose of this chapter is to determine MEY for the 
Gulf of Thailand and the corresponding levels of effort, catch, revenues, costs and profits and com- 
pare them to those prevailing under open access and MSY management. Following our theoretical 
framework we do  this estimation both under fixed and variable price assumptions. 
Fixed Price Model 
Recall that the level of effort yielding the maximum economic yield, EMEY was given in 
equation (10) of Chapter 4 as: 
where p is the price of fish per kilogram, c is the cost per unit of effort and a and b are the param- 
eters of the sustainable yield function. The 1982 values for p and c have been estimated in Chapter 
5:  p = 6.2 baht/kg or 6,200 baht per tonne and c = 183 baht per standard fishing hour (for mesh 
size of 4 cm). The values of the parameters a and b were estimated in Chapter 8: a = 77.1 and b = 
1.868 (for  mesh size of 4 cm). A note of caution is in order. The validity of the results which follow 
rest squarely on the robustness of  these parameters and the validity of the surplus production 
model (on which they are based) for  multispecies fisheries. Substituting these values into the equa- 
tion above we obtain: EMEY  = 12.8 x lo6  standard hours with a mesh size of 4 cm. The corres- 
ponding catch is obtained by substituting the value of EMEY in equation (3)  of Chapter 4 to obtain: To obtain MEY itself, that is maximum total profit or rents, we apply equation (11) (Chapter 
4) which gives MEY as a function of EMEY : 
MEY  = aEMEy -  b~&~~  -  cEMEY 
= 1,880 baht x lo6 
These results are compared in Table 9.1 with the corresponding actual 1982 figures, and the 
estimated MSY and open-access figures. The MEY  level of effort is about one-half the actual 1982 
level and 62% of the MSY level. The MEY catch is 68% of the actual catch and 86% of the MSY 
catch. Profits are, as expected, highest at MEY amounting to 1,880 million baht or 24% higher than 
actual and 61% higher than at MSY. According to these findings, MEY management will earn the 
industry and the country an additional 365 million baht in profits, gross of management costs. If the 
fishery is left unmanaged, it is expected to reach a bionomic equilibrium (i.e., zero profits) at 25.5 x 
lo6  standard hours with a sustainable catch of 752,000 t, and society would lose 1,880 million baht 
in resource rents. 
Table 9.1. Comparison of catch, revenues, costs and profits at different levels of effort based on a fixed price model, 
4-cm mesh size and 1963-1982  data, Gulf of Thailand. 
Effort  Catch  Revenues  Costs  Profits 
(St hr x 10~)~  (t  lo3)  (bl x lo6  )  (P  x lo6  )  (@  x w6 
Actual (1  982)  25.6  1,000  6,200  4,685  1,515 
MSY  20.6  7  96  4,935  3,770  1,165 
MEY  12.8  681  4,222  2,342  1,880 
Bionomic equilibrium  25.5  7  52  4,662  4,662  0 
'Million  standard hours. 
Based on 1982 data, the industry appears to put forth the bionomic equilibrium (BE) level of 
effort but the catch is higher than the BE level of catch by 250,000 t and substantial profits are 
earned, which implies that the fishery is operating on a short-run production curve (Fig. 9.1); that 
is, the current catch and profits are derived from liquidation of part of the stock and, therefore, 
they are not sustainable over the long run. Whether this is actually the case remains to be seen and 
depends on: (a) the assumptions of 4 cm mesh size and fixed price and (b) the validity of the 
aggregate biomass model for multispecies fisheries. 
Let us first investigate the sensitivity of our results to the specific mesh size we have assumed, 
which is the one used by the research vessel rather than the actual mesh size of the commercial 
fleet. We  follow the same procedure to obtain EMEY,  YMEY  and MEY for the commercial mesh size 
of 2.5 cm. The parameters used are: P = 6,200 baht per tonne, c = 244 baht per standard fishing 
hour (adjusted for 2.5 cm mesh size), a = 122.4 and b = 3.914 (for the latter two parameters see 
equation (3),  Chapter 8). The values obtained are EMEY = 10.4 x lo6  standard hours, YMEY  = 
847,000 t and MEY = 2,7 13  million baht. The results are compared with the corresponding actual 
1982 figures, and the estimated MSY and open access figures in Table 9.2. Again, the MEY level of 
effort is about 50% of the actual level of effort in 1982 which is only 10%  lower than the open- 
access equilibrium level where all profits are dissipated. Catch at MEY is only 15%  lower than the 
actual catch but profits are 80% higher. By comparison with the MSY, the MEY catch is 12%  lower 
and the corresponding effort 34% lower, and profits 29% higher. If the fishery is left unmanaged, it 
is expected to reach a bionomic equilibrium at about the same sustainable catch as MEY but with Irt  -run production 
j revenue function 





I  function 
I  TR  = PY 
0  12.8  20.6  25.5 
Effort 
Fig.  9.1. Fixed  price model applied to the Gulf of Thailand fishery (PI9,,  = 86.20/kg, 
mesh size = 4 cm). TC  = total cost; c = average cost; E = effort; TR  = total revenue; P = 
price  of fish; Y  = annual  catch; MSY = maximum sustainable  yield; MEY  = maximum 
economic yield;  BE = open access bionomic equilibrium. 
Table 9.2. Comparison of catch, revenues, costs and profits at different levels of effort based on a Tied price model, 
2.5-cm  mesh size and 1963-1982 data, Gulf of Thailand. 
--  -  -  - 
Effort  Catch  Revenues  Costs  Profits 
(St hr x lo6  )'  (t  x lo3)  (I  x lo6  (I  x lo6  (I  x lo6  1 
Actual (1982)  19.2  1,000  6,200  4,685  1,515 
MSY  15.7  958  5,940  3,831  2,109 
MEY  10.4  847  5,251  2,538  2,713 
Bionomic equilibrium  21.2  836  5,183  5,183  0 
'Million  standard hours. 
more than twice as much effort; the potential loss from this excessive effort would be about 2,713 
million baht (Fig. 9.2). 
A comparison between the results of the two mesh sizes indicates the following: (a) a larger 
resource becomes accessible with the smaller mesh size as indicated by the 20% higher MSY  in the 
case of the commercial mesh size; (b)  as a consequence, the unsustainable portion of current catch 
is reduced from 250,000 t to 93,000 t;  and (c) the MEY level of catch with 2.5 cm mesh size is 24% 
higher than with 4 cm mesh size and profits are 44% higher. To the extent that these gains from the 
finer mesh size are sustainable, there is no reason why it should not be used. However, since our 
model ignores interspecies interactions there is always the danger that the implied gains from a finer 
mesh size would prove to be unsustainable if  the ecological balance is thereby disturbed. Most 
biologists would predict an increase in the availability of more valuable species if a larger mesh size 
were used (see also Pauly 1979  and Panayotou 1982). Hence, there is a need for more sophisticated 
models to account for such interactions. Effort 
Fig.  9.2. Fixed price model  applied to the  Gulf  of Thailand fishery  = 
86.20/kg, mesh size = 2.5 cm). See Fig. 9.1 for abbreviations. 
The Variable Price Model 
The fixed price model just discussed is appropriate only when the fishery concerned accounts 
for €00 small a share of the market for variations in catch to affect fish prices. Otherwise, a variable 
price model should be used. The case with the Gulf of Thailand is not so clear-cut. While the Gulf of 
Thailand accounts for a very small share of the world fish market where part of the Thai catch is 
sold, the catch from Gulf accounts for over 50%  of the domestic market which includes the market 
for trash fish. Therefore, although the variation in the Gulf catch is unlikely to affect world prices, 
it is likely to have some effect on the domestic fish prices since the link between the two markets is 
not a strong one except in the case of major export species such as crustaceans, cephalopods and 
molluscs. Thus, we estimate MEY and other factors with a variable model as well. 
In order to apply the variable price model developed in Chapter 4, it is necessary to estimate 
first a demand function for fish which expresses quantity demanded as a function of price, the 
prices of substitute products and the consumers income. Alternatively, price may be expressed as a 
function of quantity, substitute prices and incomes. We  estimated both linear and log-linear func- 
tions and selected the latter as it fits the data best, though the price of substitute products was 
statistically insignificant in both functions and was dropped. The estimated log-linear model with 
1971-1982  price (P), quantity (Y) and real income (2)  data is as follows: 
E2 = .92  F  = 64.8  D.W. = 1.12  N  = 12 
Equation (3) may then be reduced to a price-quantity relationship by substituting the relevant 
value of Z; in our case, the 1982  real income level of Thailand, since we will be comparing our 
results to the 1982  figures. Following this substitution, the reduced form of equation (3) becomes: From equation (4)  we derive the total revenue (TR), average revenue (AR),  and marginal revenue 
(MR) functions as follows: 
To obtain MEY we also need cost (AC) and marginal cost (MC) functions, which are given by 
equations (16) and (17)  of Chapter 4. Assuming a 4 cm mesh size and using the corresponding cost 
and sustainable-yield-function parameters we obtain: 
We  may now proceed to estimate the level of effort which maximizes social benefits (MEY) by 
setting P = MC  as described in Chapter 4. Similarly we obtain the bionomic equilibrium where all 
profits are dissipated by setting AR  = AC. Finally, the monopoly position where profits are maxi- 
mized is obtained where MR = MC. The results are reported and compared in Table 9.3 and Fig. 9.3. 
Catch  (t  x  lo3 
Fig. 9.3. Variable price model applied to the Gulf of Thailand fishery 
(mesh size = 4 cm). Table 9.3.  Comparison of annual catch, revenues, costs and profits in million baht at different levels of effort bared 
on a variable price model, 4-cm mesh size and 1963-1982  data, Gulf of Thailand. 
Effort  Catch 
(St hr x lo6  )'  (t  x lo3  )  Revenues  Casts 
Actual (1982)  25.6  1,000  6,200  4,685 
MSY  20.6  796  7,133  3,770 
MEY  15.6  750  6,900  2,855 
Bionomic equilibrium  37.0  530  5,963  5,963 
Monopoly  10.4  600  6,300  1,903 
Consumer  Total 
Profits  surplus  benefit 
'Million  standard hours. 
The level of effort that yields the maximum economic yield with a variable price is found to be 
15.6 x lo6  standard hours, compared with the 1982 figure of 25.6 x lo6  hours and the bionomic 
equilibrium (BE) at 37 x lo6  hours. The MEY level of catch is 750,000 t compared to the 1982 
figure of 1  x lo6  t,  the MSY of 796,000 t and the BE of 530,000 t. Profits at MEY are more than 
2.5 times the 1982  level of profits and 20% higher than at  MSY. The Thai society stands to lose 
4,045 million baht per annum in profits alone by letting its fishery gravitate unmanaged towards 
a bionomic equilibrium. 
The results of the variable price model differ from those of the fixed model (Table 9.1) in that 
the MEY catch and effort levels are higher by 10  and 22%, respectively. This is so because the 
variable price model permits the price to rise as the catch is reduced below the current level to  the 
25% lower MEY level. The higher price shifts the sustainable revenue function upwards justifying 
additional effort of 2.8 x lo6  hours. Correspondingly the profits at MEY are more than twice as 
high under the variable than under the fixed price model because of the higher catch and higher 
price compared to only a modest increase in fishing costs. 
Another difference between the fixed and the variable model is what constitutes maximum 
rents or MEY. Under the former, MEY is identical to maximum profits. Under the latter, MEY 
includes both profits which benefit the producer if not taxed away and consumer surplus which 
benefits the consumer. (Consumer surplus is the difference between what the consumer is willing to 
pay and what he actually pays). Thus, MEY is best understood as maximum social benefit and 
occurs at a level of effort higher than the level at which maximum profit is obtained. The maximum 
profit under the variable model is the monopoly solution. 
In Table 9.3 the maximum social benefit of 12,877 million baht is at P = MC or MEY, not at 
MR  = MC  which is the monopolist's decision rule. True, monopoly generates more profits but part 
of these profits are not resource rents due to genuine resource scarcity but monopoly rents due to 
artificial scarcity created by the monopolist by withholding supplies (with catch of only 600,000 t) 
and, therefore, by reducing consumer surplus. However, the difference in social benefits between 
MEY, MSY and the monopoly solution are so small by comparison to  their bioeconomic equilibrium 
level that operation of the fishery at any of these three points would be a great improvement over 
the bionomic eventuality. 
Using the same procedure we estimate the MEY levels of catch, effort and profits for the com- 
mercial mesh size of 2.5 cm, and compare the results to  the corresponding 1982 MSY and open- 
access figures in Table 9.4 and Fig. 9.4. The MEY level of effort is 40% lower, the catch 10%  lower 
and profits 300% higher than the corresponding 1982 figures. As in earlier models, effort is lowest 
and profits highest at MEY; the reverse is true at the bionomic equilibrium. The catch at MEY is 
only slightly lower but effort is substantially lower and profits higher than at MSY. 
By  comparison to our earlier models, the variable price model with commercial mesh size 
indicates (for 1982) the least economic overfishing (deviation from MEY) in terms of catch and the 
most in terms of profits. According to  this model, which is more realistic than the previous three, in 
1982 the Gulf of Thailand fishery incurred a "loss"  of 3,136 million baht by not operating at the 
MEY  level of effort. This loss can be avoided by foregoing 100,000 t of catch, thereby raising the 
price of the remaining 900,000 t from 6.20 baht/kg to 8.08 baht/kg, increasing total receipts by 1,331  million baht, and at the same time saving 7.4 x 10" hours of excess effort costing the indus- 
try and the country 1,805 million baht. However, given the open-access status of the Gulf of 
Thailand, the individual fisherman has no incentive to reduce effort. What is more likely is that 
effort will continue to expand until all remaining profits are completely dissipated and the fishery 
comes to a rest at a bionomic equilibrium with 2.5 times the optimal level of effort, unless new 
external shocks (such as changes in technology and/or input costs and shifts in demand) disturb the 
process by creating new, short-term disequilibrium rents (or losses). 
The total rents at MEY, which include both profits and consumer surplus, amount to 14,173 
million baht, 23% higher than the actual level or 78% higher than the eventual bionomic equilibrium. 
(MSY  management and monopoly give almost the same level of total benefit of about 13,700 mil- 
lion baht). The social loss from not operating at  MEY was 1,386 million baht in 1982 and is expected 
to rise to 4,236 million baht per annum (under the 1982  bioeconomic parameters), if the fishery is 
allowed to reach an open-access bionomic equilibrium. 
Table 9.4. Comparison of annual catch, revenues, costs and profits in million baht at different levels of effort based 
on a variable price model, 2.5-cm mesh size and 1963-1982  data, Gulf of Thailand. 
Effort  Catch  Consumer  Total 
(St hr x lo6)*  (t x lo3)  Revenues  Costs  Profits  surplus  benefit 
Actual (1982)  19.2  1,000  6,200  4,685  1,515  9,976  11,491 
MSY  15.7  958  7,741  3,831  3,910  9,789  13,699 
MEY  11.8  900  7,531  2,879  4,651  9,522  14,173 
Bionomic equilibrium  25.8  600  6,295  6,295  0  7,960  7,960 
Monopoly  8.2  740  6,904  2,001  4,903  8,735  13,638 
'Million  standard hours. 
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Fig.  9.4.  Variable  price  model  applied  to  the Gulf  of Thailand 
fishery (mesh size = 2.5 cm). CHAPTER 10 
EEZS AND JOINT VENTURES 
Almost unique among developing countries, Thailand maintains a sizeable distant-water fishing 
fleet operating throughout the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. It is believed that about one 
half of the catch by the Thai trawl fishery originates from outside the Thai territorial waters (Marr 
et al. 1976;  Anon. 1978). The implementation of 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) by 
Thailand's neighbors has virtually eliminated the high-sea areas of the South China Sea and the Bay 
of Bengal, as well as other relevant parts of the Indian Ocean (see Marr 1976; Valencia 1978a). This, 
it was feared in Thailand and hoped in neighboring countries, would effectively put an end to the 
'poaching'  of fish resources by the distant-water fleet and enable coastal states to exploit and 
manage the resources within their extended fisheries jurisdictions. 
It is recognized, however, that whereasThailand's neighbors claim the right over these resources, 
only Thailand has the technical capability to exploit them fully. Naturally then, joint fishing ven- 
tures are regarded as the deus ex machina that would meet both sides' needs and interests. As a 
corollary, well-defined rights and joint ventures are expected to prevent overfishing by obviating the 
retreat of Thailand's distant-water fleet into the Gulf while regulating its activities outside the Gulf. 
The purpose of the present chapter is: (i) to examine the most likely effects on Thailand of the 
implementation of EEZs by neighboring countries and (ii) to evaluate the option of joint fishing 
ventures as an instrument for controlling overfishing, combating encroachment and mitigating 
overcapitalization. 
Exclusive Economic Zones 
The proclamation of 200-mile EEZs by Thailand's neighbors extends the national jurisdiction 
of coastal states over the entire South China Sea and most of the Bay of Bengal leaving little trawl- 
able high-sea areas for distant-water fishing (Fig. 10.1). According to the Chairman of the Thai Fish- 
eries Association, Thailand stands to "lose 300,000 square miles of fishing grounds" (Bangkok Post 
1979~).  Theoretically, the country's  distant-water fleet would have to retreat into the Gulf of 
Thailand with the consequent "loss of an estimated 660,000 tons of marine fish and crustaceans 
annually, lowering the Thai annual marine harvest by some 40%" (Bangkok Post 1979d) and 
depriving the country of foreign exchange earnings of 2,000 to 3,000 million baht. Neither of 
these losses is a modest one for a country still suffering from protein-malnutrition and mounting 
balance-of-trade-and-payments  deficits. Currently, marine products contribute over 5% to the total 
value of exports while over 50% of the domestic animal protein consumption consists of fishery 
products. To quote the local press: 
With a rising demand for food from an ever expanding population, the constraint placed [by EEZs] on 
marine fisheries, which have been this country's vital source of protein, would have proved to be catastrophic. 
(Bangkok Post, 1979d). 
Even more catastrophic, one fears, would be the effect of EEZs on small-scale fishermen and 
fish resources within the Thai territorial waters: retreat of the distant-water fleet and consequent doubling of the number of vessels operating in the Gulf of Thailand is certain to obliterate both fish 
and fishermen. In Chapters 8 and 9, we have seen that the Gulf is already overfished by a fleet 
double its 'optimal' size and in Chapters 5 and 6, that operators of small otter trawlers and other 
small-scale fishermen whose fishing range is limited to the Gulf of Thailand barely eke out a sub- 
sistence. The consequences of the deployment of an additional fleet of several thousand  highly 
'efficient' distant-water vessels in the limited confines of the Gulf are difficult to imagine. Since 
the extent of depletion would be determined by the amount and duration of profits for vessels 
remaining, fishing operations will continue as long as operating costs are covered. Given further the 
high fishing efficiency attained by the distant-water fleet (to compensate for high travelling costs), 
the danger of destroying the Thai fish resources is not an unrealistic one. Even more certain is the 
exacerbation of social problems and conflicts in connection with coastal small-scale fishermen. 
The repercussions for Thailand of the loss of 780,000 km2 of  fishing grounds and of the 
consequent retreat of the distant-water fleet into Thai waters are unquestionable. The question is 
rather whether the proclamation of 200-mile EEZs has triggered the above chain of events. That is, 
can neighboring countries enforce their claims over such an extensive sea area to the effective exclu- 
sion of the Thai fleet? Answering this question would also enable us to evaluate the option of joint 
ventures often suggested as the solution to the problems posed by EEZs. 
The main countries off which Thai foreign catches are made are Bangladesh, Burma, India, 
Indonesia, Kampuchea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam (see Marr et al. 1976). Virtu- 
ally all these countries have now proclaimed EEZs: Vietnam in 1977, Kampuchea and Bangladesh in 
1978,  the Philippines in 1979, Indonesia and Malaysia in 1980. However, with the exception of 
Vietnam which has demonstrated some capability in enforcing its EEZ (Valencia 1978a), none of 
these countries appears to have the enforcement capability required by such a vast area as the 
200-mile EEZ. Past inability to enforce exclusive rights over such limited areas as a 12-mile terri- 
torial zone (as evidenced by the pervasiveness and profitability of encroachment) bespeaks of future 
enforcement difficulties over the far more extensive EEZs. Many  authors, if  not the countries 
themselves, have recognized the problem. Marr et al. (1976) speaks of "time lag between the proc- 
lamation .  . .  and the abilities to enforce"; Valencia (1978a) refers to "the general lack of enforce- 
ment capability in the region"; and Hongskul(1979) states that "the problems of enforcement .  . . 
are critical within the region." 
While any nation proclaiming an EEZ faces enforcement difficulties, the developing countries 
of Southeast Asia have more than their share, not only because of their low level of economic 
development but because of geographical and historical factors as well. The presence of archipelagos 
containing large water areas and small land masses, the ongoing territorial disputes and a long 
history of promulgation of laws and regulations without effective enforcement combine to hinder 
'marine regionalism' (a concept defined below) as well as to weaken the enforceability of any single 
nation's claims over vast sea areas remote from its land base. 
The ability of an individual state to exert sovereignty over the claimed marine areas and to 
enforce regulations vis-his foreign activities depends, to a large extent, on the strength of its navy 
or marine police, the number and dispersion of naval bases and the size of its (naval) air force rela- 
tive to the length of its coastline and the offshore area accruing to it under a 200-mile jurisdictional 
regime (Valencia 1978a). Table 10.1 attempts to give a comparative picture of the capacity of 
Southeast Asian states to enforce such jurisdictional regimes. The figures, though somewhat out- 
dated, leave little doubt that most nations in the region are ill-prepared for the task. With the 
possible exceptions of Vietnam, China, Singapore and Taiwan, all other states: 
would have thousands of square miles of ocean area of hundreds of miles of marine perimeter to cover per 
patrol vessel or aircraft. Regulations and restrictions would, thus, not be readily enforceable with present naval 
capabilities on an individual state basis over much of the South China Sea (Valencia 1978b). 
Even more severe are likely to be the enforcement difficulties of Thailand's neighbors in the Bay of 
Bengal (Burma, Bangladesh and India) which are relatively poorer than most Southeast Asian 
countries and have economic zones at least as large (Fig. 10.1). 
The obvious alternative to individual state capability in enforcing extended marine jurisdic- 
tions is 'marine regionalism' in the sense of cooperative management and enforcement by the 
regional states or by a regional body representing these states. However appealing marine regionalism Table 10.1. Capacity of Southeast Asian states to enforce extended fisheries jurisdiction (200-mile EEZ).~ 
Area of  Length of  offshoreb area  No. of  200 nm  200 nm  Coastline  I 
Political  entity  coastline  to 200 nm limit  Navy  Major  No. of  airforce  arealtotal  mealtotal  total fleet 













Total  12,990.00  70,805  2,991.5  3.566  37  585  6.603  -  -  - 
'AS  the figures regarding navies, aircrafts and bases are somewhat outdated (early 1970s). the present capacity of some (if not all) of these states to enforce jurisdictional regimes 
is underestimated. Thus, the given figures should be regarded only as indicative of (relative) orders of magnitudes rather than as exact numbers. 
b~ffshore  area accruing to each country under 200-nautical-mile jurisdictional regimes.   he 'source' (see below) combines the figures for what were then North and South Vietnam. 
,Thailand  plans a major naval base at Phangnga on the Andaman Sea (Far Eastern Economic Review, January 14. 1977, p. 15.) 
Averages exclude Laos. 
Source  :  Valencia (1978b). Fig. 10.1. Remaining high seas in South and Southeast Asia following the implementa- 
tion of '200-mile  exclusive economic zones by coastal states. 
might be for closed or semi-closed seas with transboundary resources, the constraints posed by 
ideological differences, military conflicts and territorial disputes (all unrelated to EEZs) loom 
formidable. Consider, for instance, the ideological differences between the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Indo-Chinese states, the military conflicts in Indo-China and the 
territorial disputes between China and Vietnam over Paracel Islands; among China, Vietnam, the 
Philippines and Taiwan over Spratly Islands; and between Thailand and Kampuchea over Kut, Wai, 
Panjang and Krah Islands. (See Valencia 197813 for these and other disputes as well as for a detailed 
account of the constraints to and prospects of marine regionalism in South China Sea.) There is also 
the diversity of interests and incompatibility of claims associated with extended jurisdictional 
regimes. For instance, China, Vietnam and Malaysia would probably favor exclusive jurisdictions; 
Indonesia and the Philippines may insist on the archipelagic principle; Thailand, Taiwan and Singa- 
pore might opt for jurisdictional extension with full utilization. According to the principle of 'full 
utilization', states which lack the capacity to harvest the entire 'allowable catch' within their EEZs 
should give other states access to the surplus, presumably at a certain agreed upon fee or share. 
Boundary disputes and overlapping EEZs (such as those listed in Table 10.2) among Southeast 
Asian states are certain to frustrate any attempt in the foreseeable future towards concerted enforce- 
ment of EEZs and/or joint management of transboundary and migratory resources, although some 
bilateral agreements for disputed areas and joint ventures will undoubtedly be concluded. 
With enforcement capabilities seriously deficient and marine regionalism unlikely, the possibi- 
lity of effective implementation of EEZs in Southeast Asia will depend largely on the chances of 
persuading distant-water fishing nations to restrict the operation of their fleet within their own 
waters. This, in turn, presupposes some control by Thailand over its fleet as well as some leverage by 
neighboring countries over Thailand. While the latter may be found in Thailand's increasing need 
and desire for peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation with its neighbors, the former is 
conspicuously absent. Indeed, if Thailand has been unable to prevent its fleet from encroaching on 
the 12-mile territorial waters of bordering countries it cannot reasonably be expected to prevent Table 10.2.  Some specific boundary disputes and overlapping exclusive economic zones in Southeast Asia. 
Bmnei  Burma  China  HongKong  Indonesia  Kampuchea  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand  Vietnam 
Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
Kampuchea  \  xe  xf 
Malaysia  X  X 
Philippines 
Singapore  X  X  \ 
Taiwan  X 
Thailand  X 
Vietnam  x  x  x  x  x  X\ 
-  -  - - -  - - -  --  - 
Note  :  Entries above the diagonal indicate  specific boundary disputes (see legend below) while those below the diagonal indicate overlapping 
EEZs. Neither is meant to be exhaustive. 
:A  triangular area in the South China Sea off the East Coast of Peninsular Malaysia. 
Natuna Island. 
i~igitan  and Sipadan Islands (uninhabited). 
,Tiny  Batu Puteh Island which commands the eastern approach to the Straits of Singapore. 
(dispute as a result of unihabiteral proclamation of continental shelf boundary by Kampuchea). 
sland of Phu Quoc and  certain other small islands (unknown if dispute continues at present). 
Sources :  a, b. c, d from Whi-  (1980); e. f, g, h from Vaiencia (1978a and b). 
encroachment of the far more extensive 200-mile EEZs. Economic opportunities more attractive 
than distant-water fishing would certainly work but such opportunities can hardly be found in 
Thailand or  within 200 miles from its shores. Well aware of this, Thailand has maintained that it will 
be the last Southeast Asian nation to declare a 200-mile EEZ. Indeed Thailand did not declare an 
EEZ until 23 February 1981,  by which date all Thailand's neighbors had done so. Other countries 
are welcome to fish in the Gulf of Thailand, if they wish, in exchange for reciprocal rights. Not 
surprisingly, there have been no takers among Thailand's neighbors; not only do they lack the 
distant-water fleet for such expeditions but, more importantly, the Gulf of Thailand is thought to 
be an 'aquatic desert'  by comparison with their own fishing grounds. For instance, the Bay of 
Bengal is reported to be about eight times richer in fish resources than the Gulf of Thailand (see 
Business Review, February 1979), although the virgin stock density is almost the same in the two 
areas (see Tables 8.4 and 8.5). 
Joint Fishing Ventures 
Under these circumstances, the initial enthusiasm for joint fishing ventures in Thailand and 
some of its neighbors was not surprising. Such ventures were seen as an opportunity for cooperation 
(instead of confrontation) between neighbors towards mutual benefit and an effective means of 
luring the refractory distant-water fleet into some form of joint control by Thailand and the host 
country. The mutual benefits from joint ventures are obvious enough. Thailand has excess fishing 
fleet in relation to its own fish resources ('overcapitalization') while neighboring countries have 
excess resources relative to their capacity to harvest them (surplus 'allowable' catch). Commonly, 
both sides are in need of additional sources of protein as well as income and employment to satisfy 
the nutritional needs and development aspirations of their rapidly growing populations. 
Joint ventures, thus, constitute a 'Pareto improvement', that is, a change from the status quo 
that would benefit at least one of the parties without harming the other. But while the benefit to 
both sides is quite clear, reaching an agreement presents all the classic problems of bilateral mono- 
poly and game theory. In bilateral monopoly "the bargaining power wielded and the tactics em- 
ployed by the trading partners determine the resolution of this conflict, and on formal theoretical grounds it is possible to say only that almost anything can happen" (Scherer 1970). In games of 
strategy each player is seeking a strategy that will result in the attainment of a particular objective 
from his own standpoint. The final outcome depends jointly on the strategies chosen by all partici- 
pants in the game (Chiang 1967). The prolonged negotiations of, and eventual stalemate in, the 
Thai-Basgladesh  joint venture is a case in point. Bangladesh is reported to have initially agreed to a 
20% share of the value of the catch and to have changed its mind later asking for 30%. Thailand re- 
fused on the ground that it would be unprofitable (see Bangkok Post 1979~).  Currently the venture 
is in a new deadlock over Thailand's complaint that Thai vessels incur losses as a result of overestima- 
tion of the value of the catch by Bangladesh in claiming its share, and over Bangladesh's complaint 
that more than the agreed upon Thai vessels operate in its waters. 
Moreover, it would be an arduous task to negotiate a sufficient number of joint ventures to 
employ the entire distant-water fleet. Marr et al. (1976) argue that no more than 100,000 t of fish 
can be expected to be obtained from all potential ventures. To this day, there have been discussions 
with many countries as far as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, but few have resulted in a final agreement, 
mostly between private companies. 
Assuming, however, that such ventures will eventually be agreed upon, how likely is it that 
they will succeed in attracting Thailand's distant-water fleet? The answer depends on the relative 
attractiveness (profitability) of joint fishing ventures vis-a-vis other opportunities open to  the fleet. 
Were EEZs enforcable, retreat into the overfished Gulf of Thailand would have been the only 
alternative, and, most likely, an inferior one, considering that joint ventures allow access to under- 
exploited stocks and a share of the rents. As we have seen earlier, however, with the present enforce- 
ment capabilities, distant-water fishing will continue to be both possible and profitable for some 
time to come despite the proclamation of 200-mile EEZs. International agreements and larger 
appropriations for law enforcement within the extended fisheries jurisdictions may raise the cost of 
'illicit' operations and drive out the marginal units, but substantial reduction of distant-water fishing 
is unlikely. As long as the rents to be earned are large enough to permit investment in faster boats, 
patrol detection equipment and other defensive mechanisms (including the bribing of enforcemen't 
officials), laws and proclamations will remain on paper until such day as the governments involved 
are able to match the technical sophistication and financial strength of Thailand's distant-water 
fleet. 
Since joint ventures by definition introduce two additional rent claimants, the Thai govern- 
ment and the host country (in the form of license or catch fees), the share of the benefits allowed 
for the fleet itself may compare unfavorably with the profits from 'illicit' distant-water fishing 
even after all cost and risks are accounted for. For joint ventures to be successful in enticing Thai- 
land's distant-water fleet, additional investments in attaining economies of scale, such as 'factory- 
ships' for the collection and processing of catch and other incentives would be needed. The Thai 
government and its neighbor-partners (assuming a strong interest on both sides) may choose to 
promote joint fishing ventures either by raising the costs of  'illicit' distant-water fishing through 
closer monitoring and stricter enforcement, or by lowering the 'private' cost of joint-venture fishing 
through investments in related infrastructure and reduction of their own shares. 
Each of the above courses of action requires substantial outlays which may not be justified by 
potential benefits unless non-fishing, non-economic considerations, such as improvement in intema- 
tional relations, are brought into the picture. However, only through effective control of entry 
either at the source (Thailand) or at the place of operation (host country's EEZ) will successful 
joint ventures provide a solution to the problems of overcapitalization, encroachment and subop- 
timal exploitation of resources. Otherwise, joint ventures will directly or indirectly encourage the 
construction of new vessels, thus, exacerbating rather than alleviating these problems. Moreover, it 
must be remembered that joint ventures, however successful, cannot be but a transitory solution to 
chronic problems. Most likely, the host country would require that Thai interests are phased out as 
its own fishing capabilities are built up. 
Existing Legislation and Policy Framework 
The fisheries policy in Thailand is governed by two basic acts: the Act Governing the Right to 
Fish in Thai Waters of 1939 and the Fisheries Act of 1947. There are several other related acts and regulations concerning navigation (1913), fish markets (1953), fish processing factories (1963), 
fish exports (1980) and fishermen's cooperatives (proposed). The various acts and regulations of the 
Thai fisheries have been described in detail by Rientrairut (1983). Here, we will focus only on the 
1939 and 1947 acts which are of direct relevance to the study. The Act of 1939 defines the Thai 
fishery waters as the Thai territorial waters of 12 miles from shore and any other waters in which 
Thailand is entitled to exercise fishing rights. According to this act all fishing vessels in Thai terri- 
torial waters are required to hold a fishing license. Fishing licenses are to be issued only to Thai 
nationals or to partnerships and companies in which 70% of the capital is owned by Thai nationals. 
Foreign vessels are not allowed to fish in Thai fishery waters except where there is an agreement 
with foreign countries. The authorities are empowered to seize any vessel operating in violation of 
the act, to confiscate its catch and to prosecute the individuals or companies involved. 
The Fisheries Act of 1947, composed of 73 articles, deals with fishing areas, licenses, fishery 
statistics and fisheries control and prosecution of offenders as well as fish culture. This act classifies 
fishing areas into: (a) sanctuaries where fishing is prohibited; (b) leasable and reserved areas both of 
which are reserved for individual license holders, but the former permit unlicensed fishing by certain 
gears for home consumption as well; and (c) public areas for which no requirement for license is 
specified but fishing is subject to compliance with conditions imposed by the Minister of Agri- 
culture and Cooperatives. The act empowers the Minister to issue: (a) notices requiring persons 
engaged in fishing to be registered and obtain a license; (b)  notices requiring the licensing of any 
kind of fishing equipment; and (c) fishing regulations such as closed areas, closed fishing seasons, 
mesh size limitation, gear restrictions and catch quotas. The act also empowers the Minister, the 
Provincial Governor and authorized fisheries officers to enforce the act through the normal process 
of entry, search, arrest and seizure. 
In addition to these two acts, of direct interest is the Thai Vessels Act of 1939 which requires 
all mechanically propelled fishing vessels of any size and non-mechanized boats of 6 GT or over to 
be registered with the Harbor Department, to ensure compliance with construction, seaworthiness 
and equipment standards. 
In 1983,  the government introduced a new licensing system which "aims to freeze the number 
of trawl fishing vessels at the current level and to reduce it thereafter" (Rientrairut 1983).  Accord- 
ing to this new system the construction of new trawl vessels is prohibited and no new trawl licenses 
will be issued; existing licenses are made non-transferable except by inheritance; and obsolete vessels 
cannot be replaced. 
In response to the need to raise the income levels of small-scale fishermen and to resolve their 
conflict with the large-scale fishery, push netting and trawling are prohibited within 3 km from the 
shoreline. Efforts are also being made to develop alternative or supplementary employment oppor- 
tunities such as fishfarming, tourism and cottage industry. Chapter 11 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
While it is beyond the scope of this study to formulate a detailed and comprehensive package 
of policy recommendations for fisheries management in Thailand, it is a natural extension to  extract 
the policy implications of the preceding analysis and make some general recommendations. In the 
light of  our findings, the feasibility of stated government objectives and the effectiveness of current 
policies in achieving these objectives are evaluated. Modifications of fishery policy targets in the 
context of the country's broader development objectives as well as alternative policies are proposed. 
Policy Issues 
From the preceding analysis of the Thai fisheries three fundamental policy issues emerge: 
(a) how to reduce overfishing and induce a recovery of Thailand's demersal resources without 
reducing fishery production and employment; (b)  how best to utilize Thailand's sizeable distant- 
water fleet and technological advantage and, at the same time, reduce the encroachment of neigh- 
boring countries EEZs and improve Thailand's international image; (c) how to improve the standard 
of living of small-scale fishermen and minimize their conflicts with large-scale fishermen without 
subsidizing and/or institutionalizing inefficient or economically unviable fishing units. Taken 
together these issues amount to a quest for a national fisheries policy which would maximize the 
overall'benefits from the fishery to the society with due concern for their distribution and short-run 
adjustment problems. 
This is admittedly a difficult task for any country, but especially for a developing country such 
as Thailand which has little tradition and experience in sustainable resource management and rather 
limited enforcement capability, although the Department of Fisheries is ahead of other resource- 
related departments in both management and enforcement capabilities. With the notable exceptions 
of aquaculture (in all its forms) and joint fishing ventures, it is difficult to think of management in- 
terventions that will not involve curtailment of fisheries production and employment and increased 
conflicts at least in the short run. Yet, if  the fishing industry is not to  have the same fate as the Thai 
forest industry which has exploited itself to extinction turning Thailand from a net exporter to a 
net importer of forest products, sustainable yield management is imperative. As our models of 
Chapters 8 and 9 have shown, whether the maximization of physical or economic yield is selected as 
the objective of management makes little difference by comparison to  a situation of no manage- 
ment or open access. 
As evidenced by the Fourth and Fifth National Development Plans (NESDB 1977,1981) and 
other official statements the government does perceive these issues and attempts are being made to 
tackle them. The question is whether the existing legal and policy frameworks are appropriate and 
sufficient  to deal with these issues especially in the light of budgetary and administrative constraints, 
the high enforcement costs and the targeted growth rate of 5.4% per year in fish production. To 
investigate this question, it is first necessary to review the existing legislation and policy framework. 
In addition to the fisheries legislation and related management policies which aim at regulating 
fishing effort,  the policy framework of the Thai fisheries includes input, output and trade policies which aim to  raise fishermen's incomes, thereby subsidizing fishing effort. Such policies include 
financial support at subsidized interest rates, tax exemptions for fishing machinery and equipment, 
provision of storage and processing facilities,  price support, export promotion and import discourage- 
ment (Rientrairut 1983).  These policies are usually introduced as second best solutions or stop-gap 
measures at  a time of a sudden shock or crisis but usually outlive their original purpose. For instance, 
in response to demands for subsidized fuel prices following the 1980  oil price shock the government 
froze the marketing fees and the license and registration fees. These policies persisted long after the 
tight oil market conditions ended. 
Evaluation of Current Policies 
The Fisheries Act of 1947 empowers the responsible Minister with both the authority to 
introduce a licensing system and fishing regulations such as closed areas and seasons, mesh size 
limitations, gear restrictionk and catch quotas, and with the authority to enforce thhe  measures. In 
practice, however, the Minister has not used his powers under the act to introduce an effective 
licensing system and other fisheries regulations because of both administration constraints and 
political considerations. As in many other countries, the budget, manpower and the authority 
of the  Department of Fisheries (DOF) are clearly inadequate for operationalizing and enforcing a 
licensing system and/or other fisheries regulations. Moreover, political considerations militate 
against a substantial reduction of effort and even restrictions on its expansion. 
Even the recently introduced licensing scheme which freezes the number of trawlers and 
prohibits the&  transfer and the construction of new vessels may be proved inadequate. Firstly, as 
the fishing vessels are to be registered with the Harbor Department while the gear is licensed by 
DOF, a loophole exists which enables registered fishing vessels to operate without a license for gear. 
Secondly, with the current budget and manpower it is not easy for the DOF to  enforce the licensing 
system over an extensive and technologically advanced fleet which can operate from foreign ports. 
Thirdly, even if  the system could be generalized and enforced it can only block new entrants 
and may reduce fishing eff0rt.b~  normal attrition but it will take a very long time to cut effort to 
about half its current level as required for maximum benefits. Lastly, even if  effort could be reduced 
to  its optimum level, without an effective mechanism of creaming off resource rents, the newly 
established rents (as a result of the reduction in effort) would create such a potent incentive to 
increase effort that rents will be again dissipated either through excess effort or higher enforcement 
costs. 
Similarly, other regulations such as the prohibition of push netting and trawling within 3  km 
from the shore and the recommendation for a 4  cm mesh size are generally ignored as evidenced by 
the presence of large numbers of push nets and trawlers in the prohibited zone and the use of 2.5 
cm mesh size. A two-month seasonal closure of the central western Gulf has been recently spatially 
reduced and might soon be removed under pressure from the industry. 
The Department of  Fisheries considers the Fisheries Act of  1947 inadequate for marine 
fisheries management and has drafted a new Fisheries Act which has been approved by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Cooperatives and submitted for consideration to the Parliament in 1984.  To the 
knowledge of the authors the new Fisheries Act has not been enacted yet. 
Input policies, such as subsidized credit and tax exemptions for fishing machinery and equip 
ment, while intended to  relieve short-term hardships, are certain to deepen capital intensity at the 
expense of labor employment, to encourage new entry to the destruction of fish resources ana to 
widen the dualism between small- and large-scale fishermen. Moreover, new entry will nullify any 
temporary gains to the fishermen necessitating new subsidies in the future which, having created a 
precedent, will be difficult to  resist or remove. 
Output policies such as price supports, while intended to  raise fishermen's incomes and to 
ensure increased fish supplies for human consumption at low prices, are self-defeating  in the long 
run. To the extent that they are effective in raising fishing incomes, new entrants are attracted 
into the fishery, and, as a result, the resource base deteriorates, incomes fall and new supports are 
required. Intervention in international trade such as promotion of exports and tariffs on fish imports 
may temporarily succeed in raising fishing incomes, in improving the balance of payments and in 
protecting the local industry, but no lasting benefit can be expected under the present open-access 
status and depleted state of the resource. At present, increased fishery exports can be had only 
through destructive or 'piratical' fishing. 
Effort is also being made to conserve fishery resources by encouraging distant-water fishing, 
especially through joint fishing ventures and other fishery agreements with neighboring countries 
(e.g., with Bangladesh, Malaysia, India and Indonesia). Although some additional fish.supplies have 
been forthcoming as a result of these ventures, there is no evidence that overfishing in Thai waters 
and encroachment on foreign resources have been diminished. To the extent that joint ventures are 
successful, they tend to  encourage the construction of new, larger vessels rather than the utilization 
of existing ones, although, in the absence of restrictions on entry, even the latter will create room 
for new construction. 
In terms of supplementary sources of income and employment, especially for small-scale 
fishermen, brackishwater fisheries and coastal aquaculture as well as other fishery-related economic 
activities are currently promoted but their extent is still negligible by comparison with the number 
.  of coastal fishermen. A large part of the Department of Fisheries' budget goes towards the devel- 
opment of inland fisheries which have been practically at a standstill for the last decade. Out 
of the Department of Fisheries' 1979 budget of 213 million baht, 25% was allocated to freshwater 
fisheries, 23% to administration, 21.3% to marine fisheries including survey of fishing grounds, 15% 
to  fishery resource conservation, 12.75% to  the brackishwater fishery and 3% to improve fishery 
employment (see Business Review, February 1979). 
Towards a National Fisheries Policy 
Problems such as those facing the Thai fishing industry require a comprehensive  fisheries policy 
in line with each country's broader development objectives. One possibility worth considering is 
to empower the Department of Fisheries in a country with the formulation and implementation  . 
of a national fisheries  policy which would include upgrading its authority and budget and strengthen- 
ing its enforcement capability. Here we simply outline the main components such a policy could 
include in the case of Thailand. 
The first step in such a policy would be an immediate and effective freeze in the number of 
vessels in general and of trawlers in particular through prohibition of the construction of new vessels 
and the compulsory registration of the existing vessels with the Department of  Fisheries. The next 
step would be the issuance of fishing licenses to existing vessels based on their current level of 
catching power, unless it is determined that the current mesh size is smaller than the optimum, in 
which case a larger mesh size should be specified. Licenses would need to be made non-transferable 
without exemptions and be retracted upon the retirement of either the owner or the vessel, which- 
ever comes first, until the fleet is reduced to its optimum size. The license fees which are now 
negligible (e.g., 5 baht/m footrope for trawlers, 2 baht/  m footrope for gill nets and purse seines and 
150  baht per gear for push nets) would need to be raised to the estimated market value of the 
license. As effort is being reduced (or fish prices rise), the license fees should be revised upward 
to cream off the newly created -rents and reduce the incentive for expansion of effort. Annual 
adjustments of the allowable effort and license fees may be necessary to take account of natural 
fluctuations in the resources and changes in fishing costs. 
The government could speed up the attrition process by offering to buy back and cancel the 
licenses of fishermen who choose to leave the fishery, using the proceeds from the license fees. This 
last option could be made more attractive by offering to  retrain and/or relocate those who leave the 
fishery as well as by developing alternative employment opportunities. Moreover, it is possible to 
use the licensing mechanism to discourage certain gears such as trawlers and encourage others such 
as purse seines if  they are judged to have a differential impact on the state of  the resources. 
However, for a licensing system to  work effective enforcement is necessary. At present, properly 
equipped patrol vessels are lacking and the penalties imposed on violators are too small to be taken seriously. For instance, the fine for fishing with an unlicensed gear is set at three times the annual 
license fee. Since the probability of being detected and arrested with an unlicensed gear is far less 
than 3396, it is not surprising that many fishing vessels use unlicensed gear. For effective enforce- 
ment both the fines and the probability of detection and arrest should he raised considerably so 
that the certainty-equivalent-fine (nominal fine multiplied by the probability of detection) exceeds 
the license fee and other related costs. Moreover, the enforcement effort should be uniform across 
provinces; otherwise, fishingvessels may shift their home base to the provinces of least enforcement. 
Care also should be taken to separate the enforcement and development functions; each function 
should be assigned to different officers to avoid conflict of interest. 
Finally, every effort would need to be made to minimize enforcement costs through technical 
means and self-policing. This is particularly applicable to the government's efforts to improve the 
socioeconomic position of small-scale fishermen and reduce their conflicts with large-scale fisher- 
men. One of the most difficult to enforce regulations has been the prohibition of trawling and 
push netting within the 3-km-from-the-shore  strip reserved for small-scale fishermen. These fishing 
gears not only compete with coastal fishermen for limited resource but they are also believed to 
destroy the inshore nursery grounds and habitat, to catch large quantities of juvenile fish and to 
cause damage to stationary and other types of gear employed by small-scale fishermen. Small-scale 
fishermen, unable to compete with these gears often resort to equally destructive fishing methods 
such as dynamite, poison and fine nets. 
An effective solution to these problems with minimum enforcement cost may be found 
through the concepts of territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) and artificial reefs which would 
act also as fish aggregation devices (FADs). TURFs can be created by dividing the coastal fishing 
grounds into fishing zones each to  be allocated to the adjacent fishing community. Each commu- 
nity, once allocated exclusive and secure fishing rights to a fishing zone would use its internal 
enforcement mechanism (peer group pressure, community leadership, etc.) to prevent other com- 
munities from encroachingon its resources and to regulate the effort of its own members so that the 
resource is properly utilized. The community would have every incentive and the means to prohibit 
trawling, push netting, dynamite fishing and other destructive fishing methods as well as fishing 
during spawning seasons or in nursery grounds by its own members (for more details on the concept 
of TURFs see Christy 1982;'Panayotou 1983; Smith and Panayotou 1984). 
However, trawlers and push nets from offshore areas may continue to  encroach on the com- 
munity's  TURF; in fact, the more the resource recovers as result of self-management and self- 
policing by the community the greater the incentive for encroachment. Small-scale fishermen are 
unlikely to have the technical capability of preventing such encroachment, which if not contained 
would reduce the community's incentive for self-policing. This is where the technical solution of 
artificial reefs as trawling obstacles may be proved of immense value as they will discourage trawling 
without the need for daily enforcement of the regulation. What is required is the construction of 
random physical barriers made of concrete or car bodies within 3 km or more from the shoreline. 
While the construction of such reefs would be costly, the expected benefits are sufficiently large to 
warrant a serious study (Munro and Polovina 1984). The expected benefits include: (a) reduction of 
the conflicts between small- and large-scale fishermen; (b) more effective management of inshore 
resources without the need for recurrent enforcement costs; (c)  the artificial reefs acting as fish 
aggregation devices and barriers of access to nursery grounds would provide habitat for juvenile 
fish which will thereby survive to market size or reproductive age; and (d) higher incomes for small- 
scale fishermen who would benefit in the short run from the employment generated by the con- 
struction of artificial reefs and in the longer run from the reduction of competition fr~m  trawlers 
and the increased fish abundance as a result of FADs. 
Objections to some of these approaches will arise. Reviewers of the draft of this manuscript 
have commented that the "buy-back program" is not advisable based on the Canadian experience 
and the large budget required, that the TURFs approach is difficult to implement and control and 
that artificial reefs are not true FADS and need further study before large-scale implementation. 
While we share thew concerns and appreciate the difficulties, we  nevertheless believe that there is 
scope for improvement in Thai fisheries management based on these concepts appropriately modi- 
fied to fit the Thai circumstances (see also ADB 1985). 
Once the construction of new vessels is halted and existing ones are brought under control, 
joint ventures could compensate for the loss of employment and catch resulting fr~m  the curtail- ment of destructive inshore fishing and of  'illicit'  distant-water operations. Moreover, Thailand 
could invoke historical fishing rights, nutritional needs and its relatively disadvantaged geographical 
location to  obtain legal access to the underfished resources of the region. At the same time, it must 
be recognized that any such access, like joint ventures, cannot be but a temporary arrangement 
until neighboring countries develop their own fishing capabilities. While far from being a cure-all 
remedy for the country's fishery related problems, these options, if  wisely used, could prove of im- 
mense value during the transitional stage from a refractory open-access fishery to one of regulated 
access designed to maximize the overall welfare of the Thai society. 
As joint ventures and fishing rights in distant waters are phased out, Thailand will have to rely 
increasingly on its own fish resources; hence the need for a speedy recovery of the fish resources 
within Thailand's 200-mile EEZ. It is unlikely, however, that the Thai fish resources, even after 
recovering to their maximum potential, can accommodate a fishing fleet of the current size; nor 
could they yield a sustainable catch of the current magnitude, hence the need for a gradual reduc- 
tion of the fleet and development of alternative sources of both employment and protein such as 
fishfarming and livestock development. A national fisheries policy would provide for a detailed plan 
for aquaculture and inland fisheries development as well as for a process of smooth transition from 
capture to culture fisheries and other occupations. 
Other important fishery policy issues not covered by this study concern improvements in 
product handling, quality control and environmental protection of  the coastal zone from water 
pollution resulting from inland deforestation, destruction of mangrove forests, and industrial and 
mining waste. Improvements in these areas may contribute to the productivity of the resource and 
fishing incomes as much as the management measures discussed in detail herein, but any such gains 
would be short-lived without effective resource management. 
The ultimate success of a national fisheries policy lies in the right and timely mix of fisheries 
management and nonfisheries development. Under the prevailing conditions of rising landlessness 
and swelling unemployment in the rest of the economy, only broad-based rural development will 
put an end to the continual drift into 'common-property' resources and major urban centers. In its 
absence, fisheries regulation cannot be effective and, if  effective, will simply push the problems into 
some other sector: unemployed fishermen have little choice but to encroach on reserved forests, 
mineral concessions (as is already happening in Phangnga) and public lands or simply move into the 
urban centers creating a host of social and environmental problems. CHAPTER 12 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Two decades ago the Thai marine fishery was an economically insignificant sector employing 
mainly stationary gear and boats without engines. Today Thailand boasts one of the largest fishing 
industries in the world, emplo*g  over 20,000 motorized vessels and landing about 2 x 106 t 
of fish annually from fishing grounds as remote from Thailand as the coasts of India and China. A 
number of factors contributed to this radical transformation. The introduction of trawl technology, 
the rising demand for fish, and a laissez-faire government policy combined to attract powerful 
investors in what for decades used to be a poor-man's occupation. Small-scale fishermen, with few 
exceptions, lacked the funds and the access to institutional, low-interest-rate credit to acquire the 
new technology. Thus, a dualistic structure emerged with small-scale fisheries employing over 70% 
of the total number of fishermen while landing less than 30% of the total catch. 
Our analysis of the economic conditions of the trawl fishery revealed the persistence of excess 
profits (resource rents) for most vessel classes despite massive entry and steep rises in fuel prices 
that led temporarily to  losses. While changes in economic and biological parameters have altered 
the relative profitability among vessel classes, the opportunity of distant-water fishing served to 
relieve the pressure on inshore resources and along with technical improvements to  maintain the 
profitability of the trawl fishery as a whole. In contrast, small-scale fishermen, lacking both mobi- 
lity and resilience and being under incessant pressure from coastal trawling, struggle to  hold on to 
fishing as a familiar source of income and a way of life but manage to eke out subsistence only 
through a variety of supplementary non-fishing occupations. 
The fishing resources within the Gulf of Thailand are overexploited in that the catch exceeds 
the maximum sustainable yield and fishing effort is twice the economic optimum level. Moreover, as 
of the early 1970s,  over half of the total landings have been made from distant-water fishing grounds 
including the coasts of neighboring countries. The advent of 200-mile exclusive economic zones, it 
was feared in Thailand and hoped inneighboring countries, would effectively put an end to distant- 
water fishing allowing coastal states to exploit and manage their resources while rendering the Thai 
fishery grossly overcapitalized. In anticipation of the threat posed by a retreating fleet to Thai 
resources and coastal fishermen, and in recognition of the lack of fishing capabilities on the part of 
neighboring states, joint fishing ventures have been contemplated as a panacea to the problems 
of encroachment, overcapitalization and resource mismanagement. 
However, when considering the enforcement difficulties in the region as evidenced by past 
experience with encroachment of far more limited areas than EEZs as well as by the present'naval 
and air force capabilities relative to the claimed areas of jurisdiction, one is forced to conclude that 
'illicit'  distant-water fishing is likely to continue into the foreseeable future. True, the costs of 
distant-water fishing may increase somewhat as a result of the implementation of EEZs. Neverthe- 
less, joint ventures may still turn out to be an inferior alternative to 'illicit' distant-water fishing 
because of the additional rent claimants (the  Thai government and the host country), unless appro- 
priate investments are made to attain economies of scale. In the absence of restrictions on entry, 
however, successful joint ventures are likely to induce construction of  new vessels exacerbating 
rather than alleviating the problems of overcapitalization, encroachment and resource mismanage- 
ment. Naturally, Thailand is not anxious to  see its distant-water fishing curtailed. Continuation of the 
status quo along with a few joint ventures are seen as an acceptable second best solution: fish 
supplies and foreign exchange earnings continue to be forthcoming and a cutthroat competition for 
the Gulf's resources is averted; more importantly, crisis and confrontation with the powerful trawl 
fleet is avoided for the time being. However, the present problems arising from the unchecked 
activities of Thai trawlers also persist and assume increasing severity over time. 
Domestically, the continuing encroachment on coastal fishing grounds by trawlers runs against 
government efforts to upgrade the socioeconomic conditions of small-scale fishermen in line with 
the national planning objectives of "promoting social justice by reducing socioeconomic disparities 
and improving mass welfare"  (NESDB 1977). Internationally, the continuing encroachment of 
neighboring countries' EEZs by Thai trawlers runs against the country's efforts for regional integra- 
tion with its allies (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and for peaceful coexistence with its 
ideological adversaries in Indo-China. From the fisheries management point of view, unchecked 
trawling (especially the  use of fine nets in spawning areas) carries with it the danger of physical 
depletion of the more vulnerable species beyond recovery. More importantly, continuation of the 
construction of new vessels leads to an even greater problem in the future when joint ventures 
will be phased out and encroachment suppressed, following a gradual improvement of fishing and 
enforcement capabilities by coastal states. 
While the Government is no doubt aware of these creeping problems and possible solutions 
have been under study for some time, fishery policies to  this day have been largely stopgap measures 
in response to pressure from the industry to deal with rising fishing costs. In its desire to  avoid 
confrontation with the trawl fleet and to ensure increasing fish supplies for domestic consumption 
and exports, the government has, at different times, contemplated and occasionally introduced 
input subsidies, outpubprice guarantee, and exemption from taxes, as well as export promotion and 
infrastructure development. However necessary and useful these policies might be as short-run relief 
measures, their consequences over the long run could be negative if access to the fishery is not 
effectively regulated. 
An effective strategy for the solution of Thailand's fisheries-related problems calls for the 
immediate halt of the construction of new trawlers, the licensing and control of the activities of 
existing vessels, assistance to small- and large-scale fishermen through artificial reefs and commu- 
nity fishing rights, conclusion of more joint fishing ventures and development of alternative sources 
of animal protein, income and employment. It is hoped that the recent awakening to the futility of 
piecemeal policies and to the importance of combined resources management and broad-based rural 
development will be backed by sufficient political will to be articulated into such a strategy. 
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-  :  Nil or negligible. 
Source : DOF, Fisheries Record of Thailand, various issues. 4 
Q\ 
Table A.2.  Average price, catch per vessel and composition of catch of the Thai trawl fishery, 1969, 1974, 1977  and 1982. 
Ave.  Total  Ave.  Total 
price  catch  Composition (%)a  price  catch  Composition (%) 
Vessel class  (bahtlkg)  (t)  EF  TI?  C  M  (bahtlkg)  (t)  EF  TF  C  M 
Otter trawler 
<14m 
14-18  m 
18-25  m 
>  25m 
Pair trawler 
< 14m 
14-18  m 





14-18  m 
18-25  m 
1.74  77.5 
2.89  230.8 
2.29  510.0 
>  25m  5.41  1,174.3 
Pair trawler 
<14m  2.72  308.6 
14-18  m  4.45  322.8 
>  18m  2.64  699.6 
Weighted average  2.85  223.3 
Percentage change  (+33%)  (+I%) 
n.a.  Figures not available. 
'Figures  for 1969 not available. The indicated percentages are based on catches during June-December 1970  reported in Department of Fisheries, The Statis- 
tical Tables on Marine Fisheries 1970. 
b~he  figures for edible fish in 1982 include crustaceans and molluscs. 
Notation: EF = edible fish; TF = trash fish; C = crustaceans; and M  = molluscs. 
Sources:  1969 catch figures based  on the results of the '1969 Cost and Earnings Survey' reported in Marr  et al. (1976); these figures are too low by com- 
parison with those reported in DOF (1969): 118.6, 127.1, 516.9,  363.6 and 1,054.8 in the above order;still other figures, in between, are found in 
DOF (1971). These discrepancies cannot be reconciled, a rather 'typical'  feature of the Thai Fisheries Statistics. In this and other tables related to 
cost and earnings we follow the Cost and Earnings Surveys. 
1974 and 1977  figures on catch and its composition from DOF (1979); 1982 figures from OAE (1983). 
Average price: (gross) revenues/catch (see Table A.4 for revenues and figures above for catch). Table A.3. Average cost (baht) and catch per unit of effort (kg), Thai trawl fishery, 1969, 1974, 1977 and 1982. 
Average costa per  Catch per  Average costa per  Catch per 
Kg of  Fishing  Standard  fishing  Kg of  Fishing  Standard  fishing 
Vessel class  fish  hour  hourb  hour  fish  hour  hourb  hour 
Otter trawler 
< 14m  2.67 
n.a. 
14-18  m  1.17 
n.a. 
18-25  m  1.17 
n.a. 
>  25m  n.a. 
n.a. 
Pair trawler 
< 14  m  0.90  12.30  146.70  61.75  5.85  384.95  545.83  32.92 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  (+550%)  (+243%)  (+272%)  (-47%) 
14-18  m  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  2.35  459.74  219.51  97.61 
>  18m  0.91  259.50  147.20  142.17  2.33  1,109.85  217.35  238.00 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  (+156%)  (+328%)  (+48%)  (+67%) 
Otter trawler 
< 14m  1.86 
(-5%) 
14-18  m  2.55 
(+12%) 
18-25  m  1.77 
(-20%) 
>  25m  2.50 
(+24%) 
Pair trawler 
< 14m  1.85  630.60  143.32  121.90  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
(-63%)  (+64%)  (-7  4% )  (+270%)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
14-18  m  3.63  589.05  281.75  84.40  5.33  973.35  213.87  183.15 
(+54%)  (+28%)  (+28%)  (-14%)  (+46.83)  (+65.24)  (-24%)  (+117%) 
>  18m  2.37  799.82  183.93  169.38  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
(+2%)  (-28%)  (-15%)  (-29%)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  Data not available. 
(  )  Figures in brackets give the percentage change from the previous reported year as given above. For example the drop in the cost per kg of fish by 27% 
between 1969 and 1974 is indicated as (-27%)  below the 1974 figure. 
aAverage cost includes all costs except the opportunity cost of capital. 
b~tandard  hour is obtained as the catch per commercial vessel divided by catch per. unit of research vessel Pramong I1 in the Gulf of Thailand. 
Note that this is not completely legitimate since many vessels, especially the larger ones fish outside Thai waters. 
Source :  Total cost from Table A.4 below; catch per vessel from Table A.2 above; fishing hours from DOF (1969)  and catch per hour by the research vessel 
Pramong I1 from Table 8.2. Table A.4.  Annual revenues, costs and profits (in thousand baht) per unit of the Thai trawl fishery, 1969, 1974, 1977 and 1982. 
Vessel classa  Revenuesb  CostsC  profitsd  Revenuesb  CostsC  profitsd  Revenuesb  CostsC  profitsd  Revenuesb  CostsC  profitsd 
Otter trawler 
<14m  153.7  137.8  15.9  148.9  144.0  4.9  135.4  144.5  -9.1  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
14-18  m  173.9  149.1  24.8  372.5  427.5  -55.0  667.3  589.1  78.2  1,862.6  1,336.2  526.4 
18-25  m  462.3  444.4  17.9  1,030.4  945.5  84.9  1,168.1  902.9  265.2  4,356.4  3,247.6  1,108.8 
> 25m  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  2,566.2  2,141.2  425.0  6,357.0  4,352.3  2,004.7  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Pair trawler 
< 14  m  407.7  296.1  111.6  233.3  356.0  -122.7  840.5  570.6  269.9  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
14-18  m  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  766.1  823.7  -57.6  1,436.9  1,173.4  263.5  3,025.0  2,539.7  435.3 
> 18m  1,002.7  755.4  247.3  1,220.4  1,212.4  8.0  1,853.0  1,660.1  174.9  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
type of gear (otter trawler and pair trawler) and size (length) of vessel in meters (m). 
b~he  annual revenues for 1974 and 1977 were obtained by multiplying the monthly date on earnings, given in the sources below, by the number of fishing 
months for each vessel class (9.3, 11.8, 11.0, 11.7, 11.0,ll.O and 11.0, respectively) obtained from the 1977 survey (see below). 
'costs  including  operating costs (crew remuneration,  fuel,  oil, ice, containers  and other running expenses), maintenance of hull and engine, repair and 
renewal of gear, fees and charges; and depreciation cost; but, they exclude the opportunity cost of capital. The annual costs were obtained as follows: for 1977 
the monthly cost figures given in the sources (below) were multiplied by the number of fishing months (see 'a' above) after subtracting the 'opportunity cost of 
capital'  for 1974 the monthly  depreciation and  'other running expenses' were first made comparable to those of  1977 by using fishing months rather than 
calendar months before  multiplication  of  the reported total monthly costs with the number of fishing months to obtain the annual costs; for 1969, annual 
figures were available. 
d~rofits  (= revenues -  costs) are, thus, gross of the opportunity cost of capital. 
n.a.  =;  Not available. 
Sources:  DOF (1974); Reintrairut (1979) and Costs and Earnings Surveys, 1969 (unpublished data). The 1974 survey has been published under the title The 
Results of Cost and Earnings Survey of Major Marine Fisheries 1974. The 1969 figures are from Marr et al. (1976), while the 1977 figures are from 
Rientrairut (1979) and DOF (1979a). The 1982  figures are from OAE (1983). Table A.5.  Average current value of fishing assets and capital cost estimates (in thousand baht) per fishing unit of the Thai trawl fishery, 1969, 1974, 1977  and 
1982. 
1969  1974  1977  1982 
Vessel class  Current value  Capital cost  Current value  Capital cost  Current value  Capital cost  (Current value + Capital cost)/2 
Otter trawler 
<14m 
14-18  m 
18-25  m 
> 25m 
Pair trawlera 
<14m  65.3  187.0  95.3  274.0  132.1  378.4  n.a. 
14-18  m  -  -  264.8  -  922.6  -  829.7 
>  18m  419.3  700.0  569.5  950.0  1,313.4  2,190.5  n.a. 
a~or  pair trawlers a fishing unit is made up of two vessels while for otter trawlers a fishing unit is made up of one vessel. 
Sources:  Current value for 1974 and 1977 and capital cost for 1969 and 1974 we from the Costs and Earnings Surveys (unpublished data), DOF (1974) and 
Reintrairut (1979) (the former two series directly; the latter two through Marr et al.  (1976). Current value 1969 and capital cost 1977 calculated 
on the basis of the 1974 relationship between current value and capital cost, an assumption tenable on the grounds that increases in the capital cost 
of (new) vessels would  be reflected in the current valuations of existing vessels and vice versa. Note that in the 'Cost and Earning Surveys' the current 
value of fishing assets was obtained by dirtctly questioning the fishermen as to how much they could sell their boat, engine and other equipment. 
Capital cost, on the other hand, represents the purchasing (or construction) cost of the Tied assets; by the way, this cost has been recovered from 
the 1969 and  1974 surveys by Marr et al. (1976). It must represent the original cost rather than the current market cost of the fishing asset. The 
current value  and  capital  cost of  fishing assets for 1982 was not presented directly in the OAE (1983). The average value of fishing assets can be 
calculated indirectly from the opportupity cost of capital shown in this report. Table A.6. Annual fishing operation of demersal fishing gear, 1982  survey. 
-- - - - 
Otter trawlers  Pair trawlers  Research vessel 
14-18 m  18-25 m  14-18 m  Pramong I1 
Sample size 
Total catchlunit (t) 
% Edible fish 
% Trash fish 
Total effortlunit 
No. of tripslyear 
No. of monthslyear 
No. of daysltrip 
No. of hourslyeara 
No. of standard 
hours/  earb 
Average catchieffort (kg) 
Catchltrip 
Catch/hour 
Total costlunit (@ x lo6  ) 
Average cost (baht) 
Per kg of fish 
Per trip 
Per hour 
a~ishing  hourslday of  the sample fishing gear  obtained from the DOF "The  Marine 
Fisheries Statistics based on the sample survey 1982" (unpublished preliminary results): 
No. of hourslyear = (hours/day) x (daysltrip) x (triplyear). 
b~igures  can be obtained by dividing total catch by Pramong I1 CPUE. 
Source :  Calculated from OAE (1983). 
Table A.7. Number of vessels, catch and fishing effort of otter trawlers by size of vessels, 
all fishing grounds 1982. 
No. of vessels  5,219  2,406  1,529  204 
Catch (t)  221,375  344,614  260,535  90,864 
No. of hours/ 
vessel/  y ear  1,130  2,461  1,593  2,550 
No. of days/ 
vessel/ year  97  159  108.8  176.3 
No. of trips/ 
vessel/ year  60  34.4  12.4  9.7 
Hourslday  11.6  15.5  14.6  14.5 
Days/trip  1.6  4.6  8.8  18.2 
Catch/vessel (t)  42.4  143.2  170.4  445.4 
Catchlhour (kg)  37.5  58.2  106.9  174.7 
Source :  DOF "The  Marine Fisheries Statistics based  on the sample survey 1982" (un- 
published preliminary results). Table A.8.  Number of vessels, catch and fishing effort of pair trawlers by size of vessels, 
all fishing grounds, 1983. 
No. of vessels 
Catch (t) 
No. of hours/ 
vessel/  year 
No. of days/ 
vessel/  year 
No. of tripsf 
vessel/  year 
Hours/day 
Days/  trip 
Catch/vessel (t) 
Catch/hour (kg) 
Source :  DOF "The  Marine Fisheries Statistics based on the sample survey  1982" (un- 
published preliminary results). 
Table A.9.  Catch, effort, revenue, cost and profits of selected trawlers. based on the 1982 
survey by the Office of Agricultural Economics. 
Otter trawler  Pair trawler  Weighted 
14-18  m  18-25  m  14-18  m  average 
No. of vessels 
Catch per vessel (t) 
Trash fish as a % of 
catch 
Effort per vessel (hr) 
Effort per vessel 
(standard hr) 
Cost per unit of 
effort (@/st  hr) 
CPUE (kg/hr) 
CPUE (kg/hr) 




Revenues per vessel 
(B x lo3 
Costs per vessel 
(v  lo3 
Profits per vessel 
(BX  lo3) 
Capital per vessel 
(BX  lo3 
Return (% 0) 
Net profit  er vessel  P  (Bx 10 ) 
Source :  Number of vessels from Table 5.4. The rest calculated from data given in OAE 
(1983). Table A.lO.  Catch.  effort, revenues, costs, and proflts (in thousand baht) of the Thai trawl fbhery for selected years (alternative 
estimates for 1982). 
Total  Total 
No.  of  catch  effort  Total  Total  Net  Net 
Year  vessels  (t x 103)  (hr)  revenues  costs  Profits  Capital 1  Capital 2  profits 1  profits 2C 
%he  1982 figures include otter trawlers 14-18 m and 18-25 m and pair trawlem 14-18 m. while the 1969. 1974 and 1977 figures 
include also otter trawlers < 14 m and >  25 m and  pair trawlers < 14  m and >  18 m.  Not only are the 1982 figures not strictly 
comparable to the three earlier years but they should *be  regarded with caution since they are derived from different sources. 
b~et  profits 1 = profits minus opportunity cost of capital assumed to be 20% capital 1 (= current value of fishing assets). 
=Net profits 2 = profits minus opportunity cost of capital assumed to be 20% of capital 2 (= original purehae value of fishing 
arset3. 
Source  :  The 1982 figures were calculated from Table A.9. The 1969,1974 and 1977 figures are reproduced here from Table 5.1 
for comparison with the 1982 figures. 